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THE MARKET FOR BAD LEGAL ADVICE: 
Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example 
 
William H. Simon∗ 
 
 Clients demand bad legal advice when legal advice can favorably 
influence third-party conduct or attitudes even when it is wrong.  
Lawyers supply bad legal advice most readily when they are 
substantially immunized from   accountability to the people it is intended 
to influence.  Both demand and supply conditions for a flourishing 
market are in place in several quarters of the legal system.  The resulting 
practices, however, are in tension with basic professional and academic 
values.  I demonstrate these tensions through critiques of the work of 
academic professional responsibility consultants in such matters as 
Enron, Lincoln Savings & Loan, and a heretofore undiscussed aggregate 
litigation settlement.  I also suggest reforms to reduce the incentives and 
pressures for bad advice that now prevail. 
 
 I. Introduction  
 
 On several notorious occasions in recent years, lawyers gave 
clients bad legal advice because the clients wanted it.   
 Lawyers from Andrews and Kurth and from Vinson and Elkins 
gave opinions to Enron that various asset transfers represented “true 
sales” or involved a “true issuance” of securities even though the 
opinions were either plainly wrong or plainly irrelevant to the 
circumstances they addressed.1  
 Lawyers at Jenkins & Gilchrist gave hundreds of opinions to 
taxpayers to the effect that bizarrely complex and economically 
substanceless transactions with names like “COBRA” [Currency Options 
Bring Reward Alternatives] were acceptable ways to reduce taxes.  Some 
                                                 
∗
  Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.   
1
  See “Appendix C (Role of Enron’s Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson, 
Court-Appointed Examiner,” In re Enron Corp. (Bankruptcy Ct., S.D.N.Y.), at 26-90 
(hereafter "Batson report"). 
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of them were virtually copies of transactions that the IRS had 
specifically condemned.2 
 John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and other lawyers at the Department of 
Justice gave opinions to federal officials concluding that various 
statutory and international law constraints on the President in the “war 
on terror” were unconstitutional or otherwise not binding.  The opinions 
exaggerated the authority for the conclusions and omitted inconsistent 
arguments and precedent.3 
 In all these cases, the clients seemed happy to get the bad advice, 
at least in the short term and sometimes in the long term.  They were 
happy because the advice made it easier for them to do things they 
wanted to do – overstate income on financial statements, underpay taxes, 
or torture people. 
  The bad advice made life easier for the clients because, 
regardless of its merit, it conferred on them a significant measure of 
immunity from liability or public criticism.  In the corporate area, a legal 
opinion may raise the bar for a shareholder action by satisfying a 
condition for the “due diligence” defense or the “business judgment” 
rule.  In the tax area, a lawyer’s opinion may help establish the “good 
faith” and “reasonable cause” that enables a taxpayer to avoid penalties 
for underpayment.  And opinions often make the “advice of counsel” 
excuse available either as a response to a criminal charge or a persuasive 
argument in the court of public opinion. 
 This capacity to influence public authority or public opinion does 
not fit easily within the most prevalent understanding of the lawyer’s 
role.  Influence of this kind requires the lawyer to purport to speak 
impartially, rather than as a partisan.  Moreover, when the lawyer advises 
a client, she is normally subject to strong legal mechanisms of 
accountability to the client.  Yet, the lawyer is not comparably 
accountable to the ultimate public addressees of the advice in our 
examples. 
 The public dimension of this advice-giving/immunity conferring 
role might seem more appropriate for academic lawyers.  Academic 
lawyers can represent clients in a conventional partisan fashion, but 
when they express views in their academic roles, the norms of the 
                                                 
2
 
 
Paul Braverman, “Helter Shelter,” The American Lawyer (December 5, 2003). 
3
  Jose E. Alvarez, “Torturing the Law,” 37 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 175 (2006). 
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academy require that they speak sincerely and disinterestedly.  From an 
academic point of view, however, there is a distinctive problem with 
advice designed to confer immunity.  The norms of the academy regard 
openness and transparency as an essential guarantee of the reliability of a 
scholar’s views.  Yet, exonerating opinions are most often subject to 
conditional secrecy.  Typically, the client wants to keep the advice 
confidential unless she needs to reveal it in order to respond to some 
challenge to her conduct, and even then, she may want to limit disclosure 
to a minimum.  Thus, the academic lawyer is also in an anomalous 
position.  She invokes the authority of her role and institution as 
emblems of both acuity and impartiality; yet she forswears the norms of 
openness that the academic world regards as essential to such claims. 
 This essay is about legal advice in which lawyers purport to 
speak disinterestedly in order to influence public conduct or attitudes for 
the benefit of private clients, and which is given under conditions of non-
accountability and secrecy.  I call such efforts “quasi-third-party advice.”  
The essay focuses on the issues of professional and academic integrity 
raised by quasi-third-party opinions on legal ethics issues by academic 
lawyers.  Much of it also applies to non-academic lawyers in their 
opinion practices.  And much of it applies as well to non-lawyer 
academics who give opinions with legal consequences, for example, as 
expert witnesses in litigation.  
 I argue that quasi-third-party opinion practice in its currently 
prevalent form is inconsistent with core professional and academic 
values.  The key problem does not lie in the assumption of public 
responsibility by lawyers or in the fact that academics consult for money 
for private clients.  Rather, from both professional and academic 
perspectives, the key problem lies in the absence of transparency.   
 Part II elaborates the issues posed by quasi-third-party practice, 
and suggests some appropriate responses in terms of both professional 
and academic ethics, using as examples opinions given by Charles 
Wolfram of Cornell in connection with Vinson & Elkins’s work for 
Enron and by Geoffrey Hazard of the University of Pennsylvania in 
connection with the Kaye Scholer firm’s work for Lincoln Savings & 
Loan. 
 Part III further illustrates the problem with a case study.  In this 
case, three prominent academics – Geoffrey Hazard, Roy Simon of 
Hofstra, and Bruce Green of Fordham – gave bad legal advice with 
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potentially large public consequences.  The case involved a non-class 
aggregate litigation campaign of a kind that involves many claimants and 
raises important issues of procedure and ethics, but that typically eludes 
public view through confidentiality agreements.4  The academic 
professional responsibility experts played important roles as enablers of 
pernicious (and heretofore largely undiscussed) practices.  Thus, the case 
shows the convergence of an underground of litigation practice with an 
underground of academic practice – practitioners and academics allying 
under terms designed to immunize each other from accountability.   
 When I say that the three academics gave “bad legal advice,” I 
am being provocative.  My opinions are different from theirs.  However, 
the value of the case study does not depend on whether I am right about 
the merits.  The important contribution is to show that the form such 
advice takes and the conditions under which it is given reflect pressures 
and incentives that undermine confidence in its reliability.   
 
 II. The Problem of Quasi-Third-Party Academic Advice 
  
 A. Defining the Problem 
 We are interested in advice by academic lawyers that has two 
characteristics: first, it has an externality in the form of an influence on 
third party conduct or attitude for which the advisor is not strongly 
accountable, and second, it is subject to significant secrecy.   
 The relevant measure of strong accountability is the common law 
duty of care that a lawyer owes a client when giving first-party advice.  
The lawyer is sometimes charged with a comparable duty to addressees 
of certain traditional third-party opinions.  For example, major financing 
agreements often require that the borrower’s lawyer provide an opinion 
addressed to the lender attesting to various matters, such as that the 
borrower is duly authorized to enter the agreement.  Doctrine generally 
recognizes a duty of care comparable (at least in principle) to that owed a 
client.5 
                                                 
4
  See generally, David Luban, “Settlements and the Erosion of the Public 
Realm,” 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2619 (1995); Howard Erichson, “Beyond the 
Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective 
Representation,” 2003 University of Chicago Legal Forum 519. 
5
  E.g, Graycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Jonathan 
M. Barnett, “Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional 
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 By contrast, quasi-third party advice may not be directly 
addressed to third parties.  Often, although there is a tacit understanding 
that the client will show the opinion to third parties if he needs to, the 
client is the only explicit addressee.  In other cases, the opinions are 
addressed directly to third-parties, but the addressees are too diffuse or 
remote to satisfy the privity requirements for strong duties.    
 Take the “advice of counsel” excuse.  A client who receives 
advice that a course of conduct is lawful can sometimes escape criminal 
sanctions, even when the advice proves wrong.6  At the extreme, such 
advice can amount to "get-out-of-jail-free cards," as Jack Goldsmith 
characterizes certain Office of Legal Counsel opinions.  Where bad 
advice causes the client to incur liability, the advisor will often be liable 
to the client.  But where the bad advice helps the client escape liability, 
the advisor has no comparable accountability to the officials or members 
of the public  who bear the costs of the bad advice.   
 Sometimes the advisor will have some accountability to the third 
parties, but it will be weaker than a full-fledged duty of care.  For 
example, lawyers owe a duty to public shareholders not to assist 
managerial fraud under the securities laws, but under the Central Bank of 
Denver case7, that liability cannot be enforced through private damage 
actions.  Or to take another context central to our inquiry, the expert 
litigation witness owes a duty of candor to the court, but the only 
enforceable form of that duty is the perjury statute, and perjury is hard to 
prove in the case of opinions.  There is no liability for negligence or 
recklessness.8 
                                                                                                                       
Curiosities,”    J. Corp. L.    (forthcoming 2007).  Barnett points out that courts seem 
more reluctant to enforce the duty in the third-party than in the first-party context. 
6
  The Terror Presidency 97 (2007).  See John T. Perry, “Culpability, Mistake, 
and Official Interpretation of Law,” 25 Am J. Crim L. 1 (1997) The exculpatory effect 
of advice from private counsel is more limited, but a substantial effect is recognized 
with respect to both civil and criminal claims requiring proof of willfulness or bad faith.  
See, e.g., id. at 69-75; U.S. v. Baldwin, 307 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1962); Mahurker v. C.R. 
Bard, 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
7
  Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994). 
8
  Even liability for perjury cannot be enforced privately.  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 
U,S. 325 (1983) (affirming the traditional common law immunity of witnesses from 
damage claims).  For a survey and critique of the doctrine as applied to experts see John 
L. Harrison, "Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls, 
and Proposed Responses," 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 253 (2001). 
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 The second defining condition of our subject is secrecy.  It might 
seem that exonerating opinions would by their nature be publicly 
accessible.  But this is not the case.  Clients often want the advice to 
remain secret unless and until it is needed and to strictly control its 
distribution afterwards. 
 Academic lawyers tend to be asked for quasi-third-party opinions 
in two general contexts.  In the ex ante context, the client asks for the 
opinion before she embarks on the desired conduct. Most often, the 
client would prefer to hold the opinion in reserve for use in the event of 
public inquiry.  In this context, the lawyer’s role will be that of a legal 
advisor, and traditional attorney-client confidentiality will apply by 
default.   
 In the ex post situation, public inquiry is ongoing, and the client 
asks for exoneration with respect to past conduct (or sometimes, for 
inculpation with respect to an opposing party’s past conduct).  Here the 
academic lawyer is likely to be retained as an expert witness.9  The 
default rule is less clear in this context,10 but the prevalent practice is for 
the client to ask the expert to sign a non-disclosure agreement precluding 
the expert from any kind of discussion of the case or facts learned from 
the client without the client’s authorization.  Occasionally, the client in 
this context will go public with the expert’s opinion, but usually only 
under tightly controlled circumstances.  The client would be more likely 
to distribute a written statement by the expert vetted by the client or 
perhaps prepared by the client’s lawyers and approved by the expert than 
                                                 
9
  Courts commonly admit academic opinions on whether challenged lawyer 
conduct is consistent with professional responsibility norms despite the objection that 
admission violates the traditional rule against testimony on matters of law.  See Carl M. 
Selinger, “The Problematical Role of the Legal Ethics Expert Witness,” 13 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 405, 408-18 (1999-2000). 
10
  Some cases hold that rules like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) 
impliedly prohibit ex parte contact with opposing experts.  See 6 Moore's Federal 
Practice sec. 26.801[4].  Others have disqualified experts from testifying adversely to 
former clients in matters related to the former engagement.  E.g., Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co. v. Harnischferger, 734 F. Supp. 334, 336-37 (N.D. Ill. 1990).  These cases 
might be taken to imply that the testifying expert has a duty of confidentiality even in 
the absence of agreement, but it is debatable whether such a duty is entailed by or even 
compatible with the expert's role.  See generally Samuel Gross, "Expert Evidence," 
1991 Wisconsin Law Review 1113, 1148-52. 
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to allow the expert to speak spontaneously or to respond to questions or 
arguments. 
 In litigation, the expert who is retained to testify begins by 
preparing a written report, which is given to the opposing party; is then 
deposed; and finally, if the case gets that far, testifies at trial.  You would 
think that at some point the opinion would become publicly accessible, 
but this is often not the case.  Since discovery materials are rarely filed 
before trial and most cases do not reach trial, the expert’s report and 
deposition often do not become part of the case record.  Even when there 
is a trial and the expert testifies, the record is often accessible only at 
considerable expense and inconvenience.  And many settlements provide 
for the record to be sealed.  Thus, as a practical matter, the expert's 
opinions are often inaccessible.   
  Secrecy removes another mechanism of lawyer accountability.  
An academic who repeatedly gave bad advice in public would suffer 
serious loss of prestige in the academic world, especially if she was 
doing it in the pay of interested parties.  Consider the academic 
reputations of scientists who have publicly disputed global warming or 
tobacco toxicity under the patronage of the energy or cigarette industries.  
But as Samuel Gross puts it, "what the expert witness says in court [and 
a fortiori, in ex ante opinions] is generally invisible and inaudible in her 
own professional field."11   
 Similarly, the exoneration or inculpation potential of bad advice 
from a lawyer with a reputation for giving bad advice consistently would 
be small.  But the public and public officials know nothing about most 
such opinions, and rarely know enough about the ones they know 
anything about to form a judgment about their plausibility.  
 B. Professional Responsibility   
 Professional responsibility norms recognize strong duties of care 
and loyalty to clients and modest duties of respect for law to strangers 
and the public.  The strong duties require the lawyer to take initiative to 
acquire information and make disclosures to protect the client’s interests.  
The modest duties characteristically do not do not require initiative or 
affirmative disclosure; they are usually satisfied when the lawyer refrains 
from misrepresentation and complies with clear legal commands. 
                                                 
11
  Gross, cited in note  ,  at 1178. 
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 There has been some recognition that this doctrinal structure is 
inadequate in the situation where the lawyer gives advice the purpose of 
which is to produce the third party effects with which we are concerned.  
An early step in this direction was the application of the “due diligence” 
idea to lawyers in the securities context.  Lawyers tend to think of “due 
diligence” as a streamlined duty of care to securities investors.  The duty 
is not as strong as a full fledged fiduciary duty to a client, but it is 
stronger than conventional duties to strangers.12     
 1. Lessons from Tax Practice 
 The most ambitious response has occurred in recent years in the 
tax area.  The IRS and some groups within the tax bar have become 
concerned about the effects on legal advice of the two phenomena I have 
singled out – third party effects and secrecy.  The principal third party 
effect arises from “penalty protection”.  The taxpayer can often avoid a 
penalty for underpayment if she can show “reasonable cause” and “good 
faith,”13 and an opinion is a key part of the usual showing.  Secrecy 
arises in part from the fact that there is often a high probability that the 
IRS will never identify the questionable maneuver.  The issue may not 
be apparent except on searching examination of the return, and the IRS 
fails to examine most returns more than superficially.  If the issue is 
never identified, the IRS never learns about it.  Moreover, when 
promoters have marketed aggressive tax shelters in recent years, they 
have typically insisted on strict confidentiality commitments from their 
clients. 
 The tax sections of the American Bar Association and the New 
York State Bar Association have written insightfully about the threats to 
professional responsibility posed by this situation.  A key report from the 
New York section identifies the problem as an inversion of the 
traditional professional understanding of the nature and effect of legal 
advice.  The bar assumes that legal advice is a social good because it 
tends to induce compliance with law.14  Where, however, legal advice 
                                                 
12
  Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation sec. 7.4 (2d ed, 2002).   
Strictly speaking, ‘due diligence” is a defense to a fraud claim.  However, the securities 
laws developed a particularly demanding version of fraud liability which sometimes 
treats failure to disclose as misrepresentation and failure to learn as tantamount to 
knowledge.  The net effect is that of an enhanced duty. 
13
  IRC 6662A (penalty abatement for “reportable transactions”).   
14
  E.g., ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6; Comment, par.s 3, 9. 
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affords exoneration independently of its merit, there is demand for bad 
advice, which induces socially undesirable behavior.  The report worries 
about the reciprocal corrosion of client motivation and professional 
morale when the focus of the “tax dialogue” between lawyer and client 
shifts from the requirements of law to “whether an opinion will be 
rendered or not.”  The section urges reforms designed to restore clients’ 
incentive to seek “the most accurate legal advice [rather than] the most 
aggressive.”15 
 Congress and the IRS have responded to the problem by 
producing a new set of norms for tax practice enforced by financial 
penalties and IRS disciplinary sanctions.  The regime focuses especially 
on opinions with third-party effects – what the IRS calls “reliance 
opinions” intended to be used for penalty protection and “marketing 
opinions” given to promoters for use in selling shelter advice to 
corporate and high-income individual customers.   
 Some of the provisions aim to limit the conditions of third-party 
effects or secrecy that produce the demand for bad legal advice; some 
focus on the supply side by imposing requirements on the production of 
quasi-third party opinions.  On the demand side we find rules 
conditioning penalty protection on disclosure.  Since the American Job 
Creation Act of 2004, penalty protection in connection with certain 
shelter-like “reportable transactions” requires “disclosure” of the 
transaction on the return.16  In addition, opinions by lawyers who 
participated in developing the transaction or were compensated by 
promoters cannot be used for this purpose.17  Moreover, lawyers advising 
                                                 
15
  “Report on Corporate Tax Shelters of the New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section,” 1999 TNT Lexstat 82-29 (April 29, 1992), at 20.  Tanina Rostain was the first 
to draw attention to the general importance of the work of the New York and ABA tax 
sections. “Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry,” 
23 Yale Journal on Regulation 77 (2006).  The two tax sections do not speak for the 
whole tax bar; other segments take a more antinomian perspective.  For an overview, 
see Dennis Ventry, “From Cooperation to Competition: Imagining a New Tax 
Compliance Norm,” (Unpub. 2007).  I am grateful to Dennis Ventry for helpful 
discussion of the regulation of tax practice. 
16
  IRC 6662, 6664(d)(2)(A).  A weaker but still important safeguard is the 
evidence doctrine that, once a client asserts “advice of counsel” as an excuse, she 
waives privilege with respect to all advice on the relevant subject matter.  Thus, she 
cannot produce a favorable opinion while asserting privilege with respect to 
unfavorable ones.  In re Echostar, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
17
  IRC 6664(3)(B). 
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with regard to such transactions must produce a list of clients to the IRS 
on demand, thus making it likely that all will be audited if any are 
discovered.18  Most radically, lawyers who advise with regard to some 
shelter-like transactions have to report the advice to the IRS on an 
information return.19 
 The second category of principles governs the content of tax 
opinions likely to have third-party effects.  These principles have been 
promulgated by the Treasury Department in regulations known as 
“Circular 230.”20  Although expressed in a distinctive rhetoric and 
format, they can be usefully summarized in terms of five broad norms – 
candor, clarity; due diligence; analytical support, and reasonable 
framing.  If complemented by one further principle – updating – they 
could provide a plausible starting point for a general approach to quasi-
third-party opinions. 
 Candor.  The lawyer has to explain her own role, and in 
particular, any interest or stake she has in the success of the matter on 
which she opines.21  For example, if she helped design the transaction or 
if her compensation is contingent on the taxpayer’s success in realizing 
the tax benefits, she must disclose that. 
 Clarity. The lawyer has to be clear both about the issues on which 
she is opining and about the strength of her conclusion.  A general 
statement to the effect that a transaction is “appropriate” is objectionable 
in two respects.  First, it may not be clear which issues and potential 
objections have been considered and rejected.  Circular 230 deals with 
this problem by requiring the lawyer to opine on every material tax issue 
or to identify any excluded issues and explain why the opinion excludes 
them. 22  
 Second, it may be unclear what kind or level of conviction the 
lawyer is asserting.  When an advocate asserts a position on behalf of a 
client, she typically implies no personal conviction beyond a belief that 
                                                 
18
  IRC  6112. 
19
  IRC 6707, 6707A. 
20
  31 CFR 10.35 et seq.  These regulations were influenced by an ABA ethics 
committee opinion proposing distinctive standards for shelter opinions with third party 
effects.  ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 346 (Jan. 29, 1982). 
21
  See 31 CFR 10.35(e)(1)-(2). 
22
  31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)-(4). 
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the position is not frivolous.23  When the lawyer opines as an expert to 
third parties, she is usually taken to connote a higher threshold of 
conviction.   
 But what is this threshold?  The expert’s opinion is generally 
understood to express what he believes to be the “best” understanding of 
the relevant law.  But of course, the expert can hold a view about the best 
understanding at various levels of confidence.  Moreover, an expert 
conclusion typically combines (a) the expert’s view of how the issue 
would be resolved by those with ultimate authority over the matter and 
(b) his view of how the issue should be resolved (for example, how the 
expert would resolve it himself if he were in authority).  Most lawyers’ 
understanding of disinterested legal judgment combines both these 
elements, but there is disagreement about their relative weights.  How 
important such disagreements are depends on how idiosyncratic the 
opiner’s own substantive views are.  If the opiner’s views are 
mainstream, then her understandings of how the issue would be resolved 
and how it should be resolved will tend to converge.  Even where the 
opiner’s views are idiosyncratic, the stakes with respect to these matters 
may not be that great as long as the opiner makes clear what approach 
she is taking and explains the ways in which her substantive convictions 
are idiosyncratic. 
 Consider the “torture memos.”  If a client had asked for a memo 
setting out the strongest legal arguments that could be made in favor of 
the administration’s interrogation practices for suspected enemy 
combatants, it would be reasonable for a lawyer to respond with analyses 
such as those in the memos.  The problem, of course, is the memos were 
not styled as advocacy, but as expertise.  They purported to set out, ex 
officio, the views of the Office of Legal Counsel.  In this context, the 
memos might still have been acceptable if the authors had made clear 
that they were setting forth the positions they would take if they had 
ultimate authority to apply the law, while making clear how and why 
their views were idiosyncratic.  But they failed to do this. 
 Circular 230 has a plausible clarity-forcing measure.  A tax 
lawyer has a duty in giving an opinion with third-party effects to give a 
“more likely than not” conclusion or explain why she cannot give such a 
conclusion.  “More likely than not” means a belief that the probability 
                                                 
23
  See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. 
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exceeds fifty percent that a well-informed official or tribunal with 
ultimate authority over the matter would adopt the position in question.24  
At the same time, the rule makes clear that the expert should give a 
normative rather than a predictive judgment.  The opiner is specifically 
precluded from considering the likelihood that the transaction will 
actually be officially reviewed – the likelihood of audit.25  “More likely 
than not” is a heuristic designed to specify a level of confidence and a 
jurisprudential perspective that gives greatest weight to established 
authority and mainstream modes of argument over idiosyncratic 
substantive interpretation. 
 Due Diligence.   Circular 230 takes over the principle associated 
with securities regulation that lawyers cannot accept clients’ 
characterizations or conclusions without inquiring into underlying facts 
and, when they have reason to doubt the client’s report of material facts, 
must demand substantiation.26  The core example in tax is the client’s 
assertion that some tax avoidance transaction has a non-tax “business 
purpose.”  Before the lawyer can assume such a conclusion, she must be 
given basic facts that are at least facially plausible to support it. 
 Analytical support.  Under Circular 230, “[t]he opinion must 
relate the applicable law … to the relevant facts.”27  Quasi-third party 
opinions should be reasoned opinions.  The lawyer may not set forth 
critical non-obvious legal propositions as conclusions supported only by 
her reputation and credentials. 
 Reasonable framing.  The lawyer cannot unreasonably exclude 
issues that are material to the client’s purpose and within her expertise.  
In particular, she cannot pick out those issues on which she can support a 
favorable view while ignoring the rest.28  This principle would condemn 
the fairly common practice in financial transactions of stating principles 
broadly and then proceeding to qualify them virtually out of existence.29      
                                                 
24
  31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)(ii). 
25
  31 CFR 10.34(d)(1). 
26
  31 CFR 10.22, 10.35(c)(1). 
27
  31 CFR 10.35(c)(2). 
28
  31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)(ii). 
29
  Barnett, cited in    , at       .   26-27.   Vinson & Elkins’s “true issuance” 
opinions for Enron were qualified by the assumption that a court would not 
recharacterize the transactions in question as loans (rather than sales).  Since the whole 
point of the opinions was to justify accounting treatment that depended entirely on the 
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At least, it would require clear identification of the omitted issues and an 
explanation of why they cannot be addressed. 
 Updating and correction.  Finally, I would add a sixth standard 
that does not appear in Circular 230 but should be part of any set of 
principles of quasi-third party opinions – a duty to update in the light of 
new information where there is continuing reliance on the opinion.   
 In general, the bar has tended toward the position that the default 
rule in conventional third-party opinions should be that there is no duty 
to update.30  Where the third party opinion is given on behalf of a client, 
the bar has interpreted confidentiality duties to the client to preclude 
correction without the client’s consent.   
 This situation changed somewhat following the OPM scandal of 
the 1970s.  In OPM, lawyers gave many opinions to lenders on behalf of 
a leasing company client asserting that leases serving as collateral for 
loans were valid and enforceable.  When they discovered that the client 
had forged many of the leases, they remained silent, relying partly on the 
advice of an ethics expert that they were precluded from warning the 
lenders.31  
 The bar became concerned that denial of even the option to 
correct would put the lawyer at risk of liability under common law fraud 
principles.  The common law sometimes requires correction where a 
person discovers that a statement he previously made in good faith is 
false and there is “continuing reliance” on it by the addressee.32  The bar 
thus re-interpreted its rules to allow a lawyer without client consent to 
engage in “noisy withdrawal” from the client by “disavowing” the 
opinion to the third party.33  The newest version of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly permits any disclosures that 
                                                                                                                       
correctness of this assumption, the opinions were disclaiming responsibility for the only 
issue that was material to its purpose.  Batson report, cited in note    , at 23, 34-35. 
30
  ABA Section of Business Law, “Third Party Legal Opinion Report” 
(Silverado Report), sec. 9, 47 Bus. Law. 167 (1991). 
31
  For the story of OPM, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Ethics and the Law: A Case 
History” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1983, sec. 6 (Magazine).  The relevant rules then (as 
now) plainly permitted warnings of ongoing fraud. 
32
  E.g., Restatement (2d) of Torts sec. 551(d). 
33
  ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Opinion 92-366. 
Please cite to 60 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming) 
 14 
would mitigate or rectify the effects of client fraud in which the lawyer 
was involved.34 
 The case for a duty (not just the permission the ABA rules give) 
to update in the quasi-third party situation is strong.  The purpose of such 
opinions is to induce third-party reliance; so the opiner should be 
responsible as long as such reliance continues.  The ultimate addressees 
of quasi-third party opinions, unlike those of conventional third-party 
opinions, are not in a position to bargain for such a duty; so if they are to 
have this protection, it must be mandated.  Moreover, once the client 
goes public and presents the lawyer’s opinion as expertise (rather than 
advocacy), it has waived any plausible claim to confidentiality.35  
 2. An Illustration: Charles Wolfram on Vinson & Elkins (Enron) 
 As an illustration of how these principles might be applied 
outside the tax area, consider the opinion reprinted in Appendix I that 
Charles Wolfram of Cornell gave with regard to Vinson & Elkins’s 
representation of Enron.  The opinion addressed V & E’s role in Enron’s 
response to the letter written by the in-house accountant Sherron Watkins 
to CEO Ken Lay in August, 2001.  Watkins warned that Enron might 
“implode in a wave of accounting scandals” and drew particular attention 
to a set of transactions known as “the Raptors.”   These were ostensibly 
“hedge” transactions intended to obviate recognition of declines in value 
of certain merchant investments on Enron’s income statements.  In fact, 
they were not hedges in any functional sense; they did not affect Enron’s 
exposure to risk or reward with respect to the investments.  (In the 
Orwellian rhetoric of notes made at a meeting of the board finance 
                                                 
34
  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(3). 
35
  Circular 230-type standards are designed primarily for ex ante opinions.  They 
may require some softening in the litigation context.  A less demanding standard of 
"due diligence" might seem appropriate where the expert's factual assumptions will be 
subject to adversarial challenge and demands for evidentiary support.  It might also 
seem appropriate to leave the parties more discretion to choose and shape issues when 
opposing lawyers and experts stand ready to fill any lacunae.  Still, the basic standards 
of clarity, candor, and reasoned explanation apply.  Moreover, one should not over-
estimate the power of adversary process to neutralize the defects of opinion evidence.  
Most cases are settled, and I have heard more than one academic expert justify large 
retainers on the ground that the mere announcement that he has agreed to testify 
substantially increases the settlement value of the client's claim.  Such assertions imply 
an influence that could readily be abused despite adversarial checks.  For a discussion 
of the problems of expert testimony and a range of possible responses, see Gross, cited 
in note   ; Harrison, cited in note    . 
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committee, “Does not transfer economic risk but transfers P&L [income 
statement] volatility.”36)  Watkins made two points about the Raptors:  
They amounted to accounting fraud, and they involved large 
unjustifiable payments to Enron’s chief financial officer Andrew Fastow. 
 Watkins urged an investigation and specifically warned that 
Enron’s regular outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, should not be used: 
“Can’t use V & E due to conflict; they provided true sale opinions on 
some of the deals.”  Nonetheless, Enron’s general counsel and V & E 
decided that the latter would conduct the investigation.  The 
investigation was to be a “preliminary investigation” to see if a broader 
one would be warranted.  Moreover, the investigation was not to involve 
“second guessing” of judgments made by Arthur Andersen, Enron’s  
auditors, or by Enron’s board, but merely an effort to determine whether 
Watkins had any material information that these decisionmakers were 
unaware of when they made their decisions.  They concluded that there 
was no new information and reported back in a letter dated October 15, 
2001, that Watkins’s letter gave no cause for concern or more extensive 
investigation.37 
 By this time, however, Enron was imploding in the manner 
Watkins predicted.  As the collapse became visible, the board appointed 
a committee of independent directors, which in turn hired new counsel, 
who in turn retained new accountants as consultants.  The result was the 
“Powers report” released in February, 2002, analyzing and documenting 
a large number of improper accounting maneuvers and self-dealing 
transactions, including the Raptors, of the sort Watkins had pointed to.  
The Powers report was critical of V & E on many fronts.  With respect to 
the response to the Watkins letter, it wrote, “The result of the V & E 
review was largely determined by the scope and nature of the 
investigation and the process employed.”  In particular, it faulted V & E 
for failing to seek review of relevant accounting judgments by unbiased 
accountants, for speaking only to a limited number of senior Enron 
                                                 
36
  William C. Powers, Jr., et al., “Report of Investigation by the Special 
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.” Feb. 1, 2002, at 157 
(hereafter “the Powers Report”).  The Watkins letter is reprinted in Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Destruction 
of Enron-Related Documents 39-44 (January 24, 2002). 
37
  V & E’s letter is reprinted in id, at 46-54. 
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people “most of whom had personal stakes in the matters under review,” 
and for conducting the review with “less skepticism than was needed.”38 
 V & E retained Williams & Connolly to represent it in 
connection with Enron-related liability, and Wolfram delivered to the 
firm a letter dated just six weeks after the Powers report opining on V & 
E’s conduct in the Watkins investigation. The letter has been circulated 
widely but selectively.  It has been referred to in the press and cited in 
law review articles, and it has been shown to parties in Enron litigation 
as an indication of testimony that Wolfram might give on V & E’s 
behalf.39  On the other hand, it has never been generally released, and 
when I asked for a copy in 2003, I was refused.  
 Wolfram begins by saying he is responding to a request for his 
opinion on “whether Vinson & Elkins acted appropriately in undertaking 
for Enron a preliminary investigation” in response to the Watkins letter.  
He then states his conclusion that the firm acted “both properly and 
ethically”.  The opinion, he tells us, is based on the facts set out in V & 
E’s letter to Enron on its investigation and the Powers report. 
 About half of the four-page letter recites facts from V & E’s 
letter.  Along the way, Wolfram opines that it is “customary and 
appropriate” for a company to conduct a “preliminary investigation” 
before undertaking a “full scale” one; that V & E had no preclusive 
conflict of interest by virtue of having worked on the transactions 
Watkins questioned because Watkins’s concerns focused on “business 
and accounting issues” and thus V & E “would not be sitting in judgment 
of its own legal services;” that V & E’s prior receipt of large fees from 
Enron did not create a conflicts problem; and that V & E “could properly 
accept the judgment of the accountants, board members, employees, and 
officers in reaching its conclusions.” 
 Measured by the standards discussed above, the letter is 
unsatisfactory in at least four respects. 
 Clarity.   The letter is coyly ambiguous about how broadly its 
claim that V & E acted “appropriately” should be understood.  Wolfram 
does clearly (and as we will see, wrongly) reject Watkins’s claim that V 
& E had a conflict under the professional responsibility rules that 
                                                 
38
  Powers report, cited in note   , at 174, 176-77. 
39
  Mike France, “Can Law Profs Consult – and Keep Their Distance?,” Business 
Week (Feb. 2, 2004); Roger Cramton, “Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on 
the Legal and Ethical Issues,” 58 The Business Lawyer 143, 166 n. 109 (2002). 
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affected its ability to undertake any investigation into Watkins’s 
concerns.  But beyond that his intentions are mystifying.  The Powers’ 
report’s most important criticism was that V & E should have sought 
new accounting advice and interviewed more widely, especially people 
not dependent on Andrew Fastow.  Are we to understand by Wolfram’s 
general endorsement of V & E’s conduct as “appropriate” and his 
statement that V & E “could properly accept the word of the officers of 
its client and rely on the judgment of the accountants, Board members, 
employees, and officers” that he rejects this complaint?  Surely he cannot 
be saying that that a lawyer investigating allegations of corporate 
wrongdoing can accept conclusory reassurances from the alleged 
wrongdoers.  If this is not the principle, then what is?    The Powers 
report tells us, for example, that V & E failed to interview former 
employees (from whom one might expect more candor than current 
ones), including two recommended by Watkins, that it never sought to 
find out how much Fastow profited from the self-dealing transactions, 
and that it failed to discover serious lapses in the Board oversight process 
for related-party dealings.40  Is Wolfram opining that such failures are 
consistent with a competent investigation?  If so, is he doing so just as a 
matter of professional responsibility, or also as a matter of corporate law 
or the customary duty of care for a business lawyer?  The letter gives no 
indication. 
 Reasonable framing.  Wolfram’s most salient contention – 
repeated in three variations – is that, “Before initiating … an independent 
investigation, it is customary and appropriate for a corporation to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether such an independent 
investigation is warranted.”  Yet, this conclusion merely raises the 
further question of whether information V & E acquired or should have 
acquired in the “preliminary” investigation should have led it to 
recommend a full-scale one.  Wolfram offers no consideration of this 
question.  The focus on the permissibility of a “preliminary” 
investigation simply sidesteps the main criticism of the Powers report, 
which is that there should have been more investigation than there was. 
 Supporting Analysis. The one opinion clearly expressed in the 
letter is that V & E did not violate professional responsibility rules on 
                                                 
40
  At 174, 158-65.  On Watkins’s recommendation, see Batson report, cited in 
note   , at 166, 
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conflicts of interest by undertaking the investigation.  Yet, this opinion is 
explained only by an assertion that Watkins's letter raised only “issues of 
business and accounting judgment” and did not concern “the quality of 
the legal work previously performed for Enron by Vinson & Elkins.”  
Thus, V & E “would not be sitting in judgment of its own legal 
services.”  This premise is asserted as a conclusion without any analysis 
or any acknowledgement of alternative views.  Yet, it is highly 
controversial.  In my view, it is wrong.  
 Wolfram adopts V & E’s and Enron management’s 
understanding of their roles with respect to financial reporting.  In this 
view, what goes on a financial statement is governed by accounting rules 
and the judgments of accountants.  Managers and lawyers discharge their 
responsibility when they transmit material information to the 
accountants.  At least until they have reason to believe the accountants 
are corrupt or unqualified, they need not reconsider judgments the 
accountants make. 
 The problem with this view is that the securities laws preclude 
any clean separation of accounting and legal judgments.  The laws 
incorporate Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and 
some GAAP standards, including the one most pertinent to structured 
finance, in turn incorporate legal rules.41  More fundamentally, the laws 
require that financial statements both comply with GAAP and be “not 
misleading.”  Every assertion must comply with the “not misleading” 
standard, and thus every assertion potentially involves a legal judgment.  
Judge Henry Friendly spelled this out in a 1969 opinion the memory of 
which seems to have been collectively repressed by a broad segment of 
the securities bar during the 1990s boom.42 
                                                 
41
  Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 125: Accounting for Transfers and Services of Financial Assets, and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities (June 1996), par. 23 (explaining that proper treatment 
depends on specified "factors pertinent under applicable law.").  See generally 
Lawrence Cunningham, “Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s 
Dark Shadows,” 57 Business Lawyer 1421, 1436-38 (2002) (noting the pervasiveness 
of "mixed questions of law and accounting" in business practice and specifically in 
structured finance). 
42
  United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969) (compliance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles does not exonerate an otherwise misleading 
statement); see also Thomas L. Hazen, The Law of Regulation 610-11 (4th ed. 2002) 
(same). 
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 Watkins was making the same point as Friendly.  She conceded 
that the accounting might be technically correct.43  The problem, she 
said, was that the overall impression obscured information that would 
“affect … the investment decisions” of “the man in the street.”  She 
called this effect a violation of the “overriding principle of accounting,” 
but the overriding principle of securities law is substantially the same.44 
 V & E had been pervasively involved in structuring and 
documenting the transactions.45  The Powers report made clear that it did 
so knowing that they had no purpose other than to generate accounting 
effects that, among other things, would obscure huge declines in the 
value of Enron’s assets.  Whether this fact alone made the transactions 
fraudulent is still debatable, but there has never been a time when it was 
reasonable to think that it did not raise a legal issue.46    
 Update.  After Wolfram wrote his letter, his Cornell colleague 
Roger Cramton pointed out in a law review article that whether V & E 
had a disqualifying conflict with respect to the Watkins inquiry turned, 
not on the abstract characterization of the issues as accounting or legal, 
but whether V & E had reason to fear being sued if the Raptors were 
determined to be improper.47  V & E’s letter specifically mentioned the 
possibility of a “class action,” and given the firm’s pervasive 
involvement, it should have expected to be named in any such suit.  In 
fact, a class action was brought; V & E was named; and the court upheld 
the complaint against V & E’s motion to dismiss, citing Cramton’s 
analysis of the Watkins inquiry issues with approval.48  
                                                 
43
  Batson Report, cited in note  , at 165. 
44
  See, e.g., TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(information is material for proxy disclosure purposes when "there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider information important in deciding how to 
vote"). 
45
  Batson Report, cited in note  , 161-62.  Watkins, however, was mistaken in 
saying that the firm had given “true sale” opinions with respect to the “Raptors.”  Id. at 
162. 
46
  Compare Steven Schwarcz, “The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in 
Structured Finance,” 84 Texas Law Review 1, 27-28, 31-32 (2005) with William H. 
Simon, “Earnings Management as a Professional Responsibility Problem,” 84 Texas 
Law Review 83, 88-91 (2005). 
47
  Cramton, cited in note   , at 165-68. 
48
 In re Enron, 235 F. Supp.2d 549, 668 n103, 704-05 (S.D.Tex. 2002).  The 
plaintiffs in the securities class action agreed to dismiss the claims against V & E in late 
2006.  Kristen Hays, “Law Firm Could Be Cut Free From Suit,” Houston Chronicle 
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 Does Wolfram still hold the views in the letter?  How does he 
respond to his colleague and the court?  Wolfram has not told us.  Yet, V 
& E’s counsel continues to distribute the original letter in support of its 
contention that the firm was blameless.        
 C. Academic Responsibility 
 When academic professionals give quasi-third-party opinions, 
they raise issues of academic as well as professional responsibility. 
 University policies typically require both candor and openness 
with respect to academic work.  Moreover, both formal and informal 
norms treat as especially sensitive situations in which outside funders 
with a private stake in a subject exert control over disclosure.49 
 However, the issues raised by quasi-third-party opinions do not 
fall squarely within typical current research policy norms.  Norms with 
respect to candor typically apply to University faculty in any conduct in 
which their University affiliation is salient.  For example, Stanford’s 
policy on research “misconduct” applies “where a Stanford appointment 
or official policy is claimed, cited or implied in connection with the 
research.”  But the most common concerns with quasi-third party 
opinions involve secrecy, and University secrecy norms typically apply 
to conduct within the University, not to outside work.   Stanford’s 
presumptive prohibition against secrecy applies to research “conducted 
at Stanford.”50 
 Nevertheless, the concerns of anti-secrecy norms are pertinent to 
quasi-third-party opinion practice, whether or not we deem this practice 
                                                                                                                       
(Dec. 8, 2006).  It seems unlikely that this decision implies anything about the issues 
addressed in Wolfram’s opinion.  The largest obstacle to recovery was the doctrine that 
there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting, as opposed to primary, 
securities fraud.  Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164 (1994).   Although not privately redressable under federal law, aiding and abetting 
securities fraud is a (publicly enforceable) wrong under the securities laws, as well as 
under professional responsibility rules, ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 
1.2(d), and it is a privately enforceable wrong at common law.  See Restatement of 
Torts sec  876(a). 
49
  See Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of 
Higher Education (2003); Deborah L. Rhode, In Pursuit of Knowledge: Scholars, 
Status, and Academic Culture 47-62 (2006). 
50
  Stanford University, Research Policy Handbook Doc. 2.5, sec. 1(A)(3); Doc. 
2.6, sec. 1, at www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/ (visited July 16, 2007). 
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to occur “at” the University.  Third-party opinion practice often gives 
individuals with private stakes in the issues significant control over the 
expression and disclosure of the academic’s views.  Moreover, these 
views and the work on which they are based significantly implicate the 
academic’s institution.  The implication arises because the client, in 
disseminating the views, invariably invokes the expert’s University 
affiliation and because the third-party effect of the views depends, often 
heavily, on the University’s reputation for impartiality and reliability.  
 For an illustration of the problem, consider Geoffrey Hazard’s 
role in the Kaye Scholer affair.  In 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) brought charges of unprofessional conduct against the Kaye 
Scholer law firm in connection with its representation of Lincoln Savings 
& Loan, which had undergone one of the more spectacular failures in the 
Savings & Loan crisis.  The charges were never officially resolved on 
the merits; Kaye Scholer settled the case without conceding wrongdoing.   
Much of the organized bar rallied around Kaye Scholer, and while 
sympathy has been expressed for the charges by academics and 
journalists, the dominant impression among practitioners is probably that 
they were unfair. 
 After the charges were announced, Kaye Scholer launched a 
public relations campaign in which an early move was the release of a 
22-page statement purporting to summarize the opinion of “Professor 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., of the Yale Law School, the nation’s foremost 
authority on legal ethics.”  The opinion was drafted to convey a general 
endorsement of Kaye Scholer’s conduct without acknowledging or 
engaging the specifics of any of the OTS charges.  In particular, the 
opinion adopted the central line of Kaye Scholer’s campaign, which was 
to mischaracterize the OTS charges as based on claims of failure to 
disclose information about client wrongdoing.  Thus, the statement 
repeatedly asserted anodyne propositions such as “Kaye Scholer did not 
have a duty to disclose weaknesses in Lincoln’s position”.  In fact, not 
one of the many charges was based on failure to disclose; all the charges 
concerning deceit alleged active participation by the firm in the client’s 
misconduct.  The statement concluded that “in the conduct described 
above, Kaye Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical 
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conduct.”  Yet, virtually none of the conduct OTS alleged had been 
“described above.”51 
 Hazard’s opinion has been widely cited by Kaye Scholer’s many 
defenders.  Yet, Hazard has indicated repeatedly but vaguely that the 
opinion may not represent his views.52  When I suggested that Hazard 
had a duty as an academic to clarify his views and respond to criticisms, 
or at least to correct the client’s mischaracterizations of his views, he 
denied that he had any such duty, offering as explanation only that there 
was “no authority” saying that he did.53 
 It bewilders me how Yale University or the University of 
Pennsylvania (where Hazard subsequently moved) could find such 
activity consistent with its dignity and responsibility.  Universities do not 
vouch for the validity of the views their faculty members express, but 
they should oblige them to respect basic guidelines, including one that 
insists that an academic must actually believe the views she endorses.  In 
effect, Hazard rented the University’s imprimatur to Kaye Scholer for his 
own profit, allowing the firm to make virtually unconditional use of it.  
The use the firm made of the University’s reputation – to give an aura of 
soundness and impartiality to its own self-interested conclusion – was 
inconsistent with the principles on which that reputation is based. 
  Academic institutions, and law schools in particular, should 
elaborate their principles of candor and openness to apply to quasi-third-
party opinion practice.  To start things off, I propose a basic norm.  The 
institutions should announce it as an aspiration to which all members are 
                                                 
51
  Hazard’s opinion is reprinted in Practising Law Institute, The Attorney-Client 
Relationship After Kaye Scholer 381-402 (1992).  My critical characterization draws on 
William H. Simon, “The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the 
Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology,” 23 Law & Social Inquiry 243, 247-61 
(1998). 
52
  When the American Lawyer criticized his opinion, Hazard vaguely distanced 
himself from it, noting that it was “kind of preliminary.”  Susan Beck and Michael 
Orey, “They Got What They Deserved,” American Lawyer 67, 75 (1992).  The 
textbook of which Hazard is co-author conceded that the OTS charges were “at least as 
strong” as those a federal court held sufficient to withstand summary judgment in a case 
against another firm that represented Lincoln. Geoffrey C. Hazard et al, The Law and 
Ethics of Lawyering 91 (2d ed. 1994).  In his reply to my 1998 criticism, he indicated 
that he was not aware what the precise factual allegations or charges were at the time 
Kaye Scholer drafted its report of his opinion.  Geoffrey C. Hazard, “The Duty or 
Option of Silence,” 23 Law & Social Inquiry 339 (1998). 
53
  Id., at 339. 
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expected to adhere.  It could be enforced through criticism and shaming 
without any formal disciplinary process.  It could also be enforced more 
formally and coercively, but I take no position on whether that would be 
a good idea.54 
 Here is the basic norm: When an academic publicly expresses a 
view as an expert or authorizes another to attribute an expert view to her, 
she should take care that the view be publicly accessible and clearly and 
accurately expressed, with its basis as fully stated as feasible.  This duty 
includes an obligation to clarify and revise public description of her view 
as long as the view is the subject of public attention.  The academic 
should not make any private commitments incompatible with this 
principle.  Exceptions may be made but only in compelling 
circumstances, and they should be publicly documented to the extent 
feasible. 
 The “as an expert” qualification is designed to exclude both 
amateur opinions not associated with the academic’s field and views 
expressed as a partisan advocate, as long as academic authority is not 
invoked for them.  
 Under this norm, when the client goes public with the expert’s 
opinion, the expert may not, without exceptional reasons, permit her to 
do so selectively, as Wolfram has permitted with his Vinson & Elkins 
opinion, or to control the public characterization of her views, as Hazard 
has done with his Kaye Scholer opinion.  She should make them as 
readily accessible as possible.  If she has substantial quasi-third party 
practice, she should maintain a website on which to post her opinions.  
 It would be a challenging task to devise principles for deciding 
when a client’s desire for confidentiality is sufficiently compelling to 
warrant exceptions.  For now, I merely note that it will often be possible 
to accommodate the client’s need for confidentiality while making most 
of the expert’s opinion accessible.  Bar association ethics committees 
and sometimes disciplinary bodies, for example, have long experience of 
reporting opinions and decisions publicly in forms that conceal the 
identity of the parties involved in the underlying case while giving a 
detailed account of their factual bases. 
                                                 
54
  My hesitation arises from awareness that important academic values 
sometimes produce oppressive over-regulation.  Human subjects review boards are a 
notable example.  See Philip Hamburger, “The New Censorship: Institutional Review 
Boards,” 2004 Supreme Court Review 271. 
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 In the litigation context, we can acknowledge two problems that 
will be encountered in implementing the principle, though neither 
ultimately presents a serious objection to it. 
 First, there is the problem of drawing the line between first party 
and quasi-third-party legal advice.  In the ex ante situation, where the 
client has not yet acted, the client often consults the lawyer for advice 
about how she should proceed; then when the client decides on a course 
of action, she may want to rely on the lawyer’s advice for support in the 
event the conduct is later challenged.  In the ex post situation, the client 
is looking for exoneration.  She consults the lawyer to find out what the 
lawyer’s view would be, and plans to use the view only if it is 
supportive.  In either of these situations, it seems appropriate for the 
lawyer to consider her role as a first-party legal advisor, subject to 
normal confidentiality obligations, up to the point at which it becomes 
highly probable that the client will rely publicly on the advice.  At that 
point, confidentiality with respect to all matters on which the advice is 
based is no longer appropriate.55   
 The expert should not, without good reason, postpone disclosure 
to accommodate the client’s strategic interests.  Sometimes the client 
may be content with prompt disclosure because it will strengthen its 
claim of good faith in the event that its conduct is challenged.  Often the 
client will not be happy about early disclosure.  The expert will then 
have to evaluate the legitimacy of the client’s reasons.  A desire to 
minimize the chances of public discovery or scrutiny should not be a 
sufficient reason unless the client has a plausible claim of privacy with 
respect to the matter.  Regulators may be able to pass rules tailored to 
specific fields.  For example, it would not be a radical step for the IRS to 
add to its current regime a requirement that opinions can be used for 
                                                 
55
  In the course of litigation, the client’s reliance on advice of counsel as a 
defense usually constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege by “putting in issue” 
the otherwise confidential communications, In re Echostar, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), and the decision to call an expert as a witness at trial opens his opinions to broad 
discovery.  Jack Weinstein et al., 2 Weinstein’s Evidence, par. 503(a)[3][01], and 
sources cited at notes 17-18.  The transparency principle recommended above just 
generalizes these norms. 
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penalty protection only if they have been made accessible to the IRS no 
later than the filing of the relevant return.56  
 Second, the proposals are in strong tension with the conception of 
the expert witness's role that prevails among litigators.  This conception 
virtually erases the distinction between expert and advocate.  It applies to 
witnesses the confidentiality and conflict-of-interest norms the bar 
prescribes for partisan lawyers.  It instructs the witness to develop her 
opinions in private, consulting only the party who retained her and the 
party's partisan advisors.  And it tells her to avoid making records of her 
preliminary thoughts.  It forbids outside consultation and casual writing 
in order to prevent later disclosures that might reduce strategically 
advantageous surprise at trial or create opportunities for impeachment 
with what turn out to be prior inconsistent statements.57 
 There are two problems with the litigators' view.  First, it is 
inconsistent with the premise on which the expert is presented to the 
court, which is that the expert is disinterested and testifying to what she 
genuinely believes to be the best answer to the question.  Second, where 
the expert is an academic or relies on academic credentials, it is 
inconsistent with the premises of the academy as to how sound 
understanding is achieved.  These premises prescribe openness and the 
continuous exchange of views among different perspectives.  They treat 
willingness to reconsider one's views as a sign of self-confidence and 
integrity, rather than as the litigators' view it, of weakness or duplicity. 
 No wonder that many experts are confused about their roles.  
They know they are supposed to be independent to some degree, but they 
have trouble defining that degree, and they get little help from the 
litigators.  The economic pressures that arise from the fact that the client 
is paying are reinforced in circumstances where the expert can discuss 
her opinions and her role only with partisans. 
 Tension with the litigation culture is inevitable in any effort to 
vindicate academic values with respect to quasi-third-party advice.  But 
academic standards could make a difference.  Even without direct formal 
enforcement, they might generate pressures through shaming within the 
                                                 
56
  Current rules require or condition benefits on the disclosure of certain 
transactions but generally don’t require advance disclosure of opinions.  See note   
above. 
57
  This conception is noted and criticized in Gross, cited in note   ; and Harrison, 
cited in note   . 
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academy.  And courts could treat their violation as appropriate 
impeachment in court.  
 
 III. A Case Study: Ethics Experts and Defendant Payments to 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Aggregate Litigation 
 
 A recent case involving settlement of aggregate litigation offers 
further illustration of the problems of quasi-third party academic advice.  
The settlement was negotiated in 2000 by the New York firm of Leeds, 
Morelli & Brown (LM&B) on behalf of hundreds of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs with the cell phone company Nextel.  (Nextel 
has since been merged into Sprint.)  Former clients have sued LM&B for 
malpractice and other misconduct in connection with the case.  Other 
lawsuits by former clients have alleged similar conduct by the firm in 
group representations against four other employers.58 
 The Nextel case is important for both what it shows about 
plaintiffs’ lawyer responsibility in aggregate litigation and what it shows 
about the market for quasi-third-party opinions.  The dispersion of 
individual claimants in aggregate litigation and their relatively small 
stakes raises concerns about the efficacy of traditional mechanisms of 
lawyer-client accountability.  With the class action, this concern has led 
to distinctive supervisory procedures that often create roles for experts.  
Notably, procedural rules require judicial certification of the adequacy of 
class representation and the fairness of settlements, and counsel often 
bring in experts to re-assure the court on such matters.59  Our case 
involved, not a class action, but informally aggregated individual claims.  
This procedure eluded the judicial scrutiny required for class actions, and 
even the minimal accountability that arises from public filing.60  
                                                 
58
  Ficklin v. Penguin Group USA, N.J.Super. Ct., Essex County, NO. ESX-L-
003765-03; Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (S.D.N.Y., Civil No. 04 CV 08391) 
(Prudential Securities); Ganci v. Prudential Insurance Co. (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen Co., 
Civil No. L-1806-05); Lee v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (N.Y. Supreme Ct., Kings 
County, No. 8651/05) (Bear Stearns). 
59
  FRCP 23(a),(e).  A notable illustration of the role of experts can be found in 
the district court opinion in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 292-
310 (E.D.Pa. 1994); rev'd 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); affi'd sub nom. Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing the expert testimony of 
Professors Geoffrey Hazard, Susan Koniak, Roger Cramton, and John Coffee). 
60
  See Erichson, cited in note   above. 
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Nevertheless, the lawyers involved, recognizing the possibility of later 
challenge, called on academic experts for ex ante legitimation, and when 
challenge emerged, retained further ex post expertise.  The academics 
responded in a manner that left unabated, and perhaps exacerbated, the 
accountability problems inherent in the situation. 
 My views on this transaction are hotly disputed, but an important 
purpose of my argument does not depend on whether I am right about 
the merits.  That purpose is to show that academic expertise can be quite 
influential in high-stakes situations and that the form it takes and the 
circumstances under which it is delivered are often not conducive to 
reliability.  The expert advice given in this case, especially a centrally 
influential ex ante opinion by Geoffrey Hazard, involved striking 
departures from the norms of analytical support and reasonable framing 
discussed above.  Moreover, the advice was given under conditions of 
strong secrecy and thus (until now) largely immune from public and peer 
scrutiny.61  
                                                 
61
  I learned about the Nextel settlement as a consultant to plaintiffs’ counsel in 
some of the cases arising from settlements negotiated by LM&B. 
 There have been three lawsuits against LM&B by former clients in the Nextel 
matter.  A class action in Colorado state court on behalf of all the original claimants 
except about forty opt-outs was settled.  Foster v. Leeds Morelli & Brown, Colorado 
District Court, County of Arapahoe (No. 02-CV-1484).  (Several of the Nextel 
claimants were from Colorado, and LM&B opened an office in Colorado in the course 
of the case.)  The record of this case has been sealed, and no one is allowed to discuss 
the terms of the settlement.   
 A second Colorado case was filed on behalf of two of the original clients who 
opted out of the class action.  McNeil v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (Colorado District 
Court, Denver County; No. 03CV893).  I refer to this case below as "the Denver case".   
The two claimants in the Denver case were distinctively situated because they had been 
employed by LM&B to assist in communicating with other clients and (they say, 
though the firm disputes it) soliciting new clients.  A jury verdict in favor of the 
defendants was returned after a trial in November, 2007.   
 The third case is a class action originally filed in New Jersey state court, but 
after removal to federal court and interdistrict transfer, is now pending in the Southern 
District of New York.  Johnson v. Nextel (Civil No. 1:07-cv-08473-GBD).   It seeks to 
represent the remaining opt-out claimants against LM&B and to assert claims against 
Nextel on behalf of all the original clients.  I refer to this case below as "the federal 
case." 
 I had no involvement in the Colorado class action.  I have consulted informally 
with plaintiffs' counsel in the federal case.  I agreed to testify as an expert for the 
plaintiff's in the Denver case but ultimately did not do so.  (The court granted a defense 
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 A. Factual Background 
 Although there is much disagreement between LM&B and many 
of their former clients, the facts that concern us are undisputed, with 
some exceptions that I indicate below. 
 1. LM&B and its 587 Clients 
 Sometime prior to the beginning of 2000, LM&B signed up as 
clients hundreds of people with employment discrimination claims 
against Nextel.  In the retainers I have seen, the firm undertook to 
represent the client in a "labor action" and to contact Nextel "to seek a 
negotiated settlement and, if necessary, the filing of a lawsuit regarding 
your claims."  The retainers provide that any recovery be divided one-
third to the firm and two-thirds to the client.62 
  The firm filed more than 200 EEOC complaints against Nextel 
and made various public pronouncements accusing the company of 
discriminatory practices.63  Nextel responded in a June, 2000, press 
                                                                                                                       
motion to exclude me on the ground that pretrial disclosure of my testimony had been 
inadequate.  Plaintiff's counsel has stated that he had decided not to call me.) 
 Because the Colorado class action is sealed and there has been little discovery 
in the federal case, the litigation opinions and much of the evidence I refer to come 
from the Denver case.  The circumstances of the two plaintiffs in that case were in 
some respects unusual, but the opinions and evidence to which I refer apply to the 
general experience of the great majority of claimants. 
 A few readers have expressed qualms about my carrying into the realm of 
scholarship a debate I was invited to join as a litigation consultant or expert.  My view 
is that this practice is not only permissible (where not inconsistent with confidentiality 
commitments), but desirable.  In effect, I am treating my consulting role as an extension 
of my academic one.  And so I should.  The idea that the two roles are continuous is 
implied when the consulting expert's academic credentials are invoked as a token of 
reliability.  In reporting my views, I am subjecting them to the test of peer scrutiny that 
the academy regards as critical to reliability.  Continuity is also implied in the frequent 
argument by academics that consulting benefits their academic work by putting them in 
touch with practice.  A large part of this benefit would be sacrificed if they felt 
categorically barred from making the most effective use of their experience.  
 Finally, without suggesting that such refusal is either a necessary or a 
sufficient condition of scholarly detachment, I report that I declined to take a fee for my 
work on the matter. 
62
  Undated retainer agreements signed by Denise McNeil and Alencia Ashton-
Moore.  Copies of all documents pertaining to LM&B and the Nextel case are on file 
with the Stanford Law Review and are posted at www. [url] 
63
  Defendants Leeds, Morelli &Brown, P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli, 
Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Supplemental Summary of Expert 
Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(4) [hereafter "LM&B Supplemental 
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release that LM&B had refused to discuss all but a few of the claims 
until Nextel “captulat[ed] to exorbitant fee demands.”64   
 Negotiations resumed, and in September 2000, LM&B and 
Nextel executed a "Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement" 
(“DRSA”).  By this time, LM&B represented 587 people with 
discrimination claims against Nextel.65  LM&B purported to sign the 
agreement "on behalf of itself and the Claimants" (p.29).66 The 
agreement is 29 double-spaced pages with about 20 pages of 
attachments.  Exhibit A to the DRSA is a three-page form "Individual 
Agreement" intended for use by the claimants to assent to or ratify it. 
 2. The Aggregate Settlement Agreement (DRSA). 
 The agreement is not lucidly written and requires careful reading, 
but the basic terms are undisputed. 
 a. LM&B agrees to deliver client agreements and to process 
claims speedily. 
 The claimants waive their rights to pursue their claims in any 
judicial or administrative forum, and specifically to bring a class action; 
waive rights to punitive or injunctive relief, and agree to resolve the 
claims in a specified alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) process. 
(Par.s 5, 7(a), 7(e); Exhibit A, par.2)  The process begins with an 
exchange of information by each claimant and the company and then 
proceeds, if necessary, through negotiation, mediation, and binding 
arbitration. (Pp. 12-21)  Nextel agrees to pay the “administrative fees” of 
the process (specifically excluding the costs of expert advisors or 
witnesses for the claimant). (7(f)) 
 To begin the process, LM&B agrees “[a]s promptly as possible” 
to deliver to Nextel signed "Individual Agreements" from its 587 clients 
confirming their acceptance of the ADR procedure, along with 
statements regarding their claims. (Par. 6)  The firm also agrees to 
deliver within two weeks requests or stipulations for dismissal of all 
administrative complaints filed by any of the claimants. (Par. 7(f)) 
                                                                                                                       
Disclosure"], at 3, 12, 19; Deposition of Stephen Morelli  in the Denver case 
(September 18, 2006), at 61. 
64
  The release appears at:  http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=63347&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=99828&highlight= (visited 
November 26, 2007).  Hard copy on file. 
65
  Letter from Gregory Raiskin to Jeffrey K. Brown, August 29, 2001, p.1. 
66
  References to the DRSA are given as page or paragraph numbers in the text. 
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 LM&B acknowledges its understanding that, for Nextel, “time is 
of the essence” with respect to the various deadlines set out in the 
agreement. (Par. 1(c))  
 b. Nextel agrees to pay LM&B $7.5 million.    
 Nextel promises two forms of payment to LM&B.  The payments 
total $7.5 million, although the total does not appear in the agreement. 
 First, attorneys’ fees and expenses.  Nextel agrees to pay $5.5 
million to LM&B for attorneys' fees and otherwise unreimbursed 
expenses of representing the claimants in the ADR process.  The firm 
gets $2 million within three business days after it has delivered to Nextel 
signed and notarized "individual agreements" from "each claimant."  It 
then becomes entitled to $1.5 million more when half of the claims have 
proceeded to resolution in the process, and the remaining $2 million 
when all the claims have been resolved. (Par.s 11(a), 14)  LM&B agrees 
that all claims will be resolved within 45 weeks of the "effective date" of 
the DRSA (basically, the date of the delivery of the individual 
agreements).  Nextel may deduct $50,000 from the final payment due 
LM&B for each month after this deadline that any claims have not been 
resolved or submitted to binding arbitration (with certain minor 
exceptions).  (Par. 11(b)) 
 Second, the “consultancy.”  On conclusion of the ADR process, 
Nextel agrees to retain LM&B as a "legal consultant, with only such 
duties and responsibilities as may be assigned to it by Nextel and which 
may include assistance and legal advice with regard to the Companies' 
anti-discrimination and diversity policies and programs."  Nextel is to 
pay LM&B $83,333.34 per month for 24 months (a total of $2 million, 
though that figure does not appear in the document). (Par. 12)   
 c. LM&B agrees to refuse to represent or refer other claimants.  
LM&B agrees not to represent any new clients with claims against 
Nextel.  This commitment is explained as a consequence of LM&B's 
belief that "it is in the best interest of its clients that it devote its 
resources" to the current claims. (Par. 1(c))  LM&B also agrees not to 
refer anyone with claims against Nextel to other lawyers (or to accept 
any fees for such referrals).  This commitment is explained as a 
consequence of LM&B's belief that "it is in the best interest of LM&B's 
clients for the Company not to be distracted" by other claims. (Par. 2(c)) 
 d. Clients are forbidden to discuss claims with each other or 
anyone else except  professional advisors.   The DRSA and the 
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individual agreements provided that each claimant will not disclose 
anything about the DRSA or her claim against Nextel to "any person" 
except the claimant's "personal attorney or financial advisor, or expert 
retained" for the purposes of the ADR process.  In the event a claimant 
makes a prohibited disclosure, he or she forfeits her right to 
compensation (and must return any compensation received) and remains 
bound by her waiver of judicial and administrative recourse. (Par. 4; 
Exhibits A, D) 
 e. Clients are obliged to stay with LM&B, and LM&B is 
prohibited from associating outside counsel. 
 The agreement provided that, “Each claimant agrees that LM&B 
shall be his/her legal representative throughout DRP….” (Par. 7(a); Ex. 
A, par 1)   It also provides that LM&B may not retain any lawyer not 
associated with the firm to represent or assist in representing any 
Claimant.  (Par. 11(a)) 
 3. The Individual Agreements and the ADR Process.  
 a.. Most clients agree after consultation with LM&B. 
 By February 7, 2001, all but fourteen of the 587 claimants had 
signed “individual agreement forms” accepting the DRSA.  LM&B and 
Nextel negotiated an amendment to the DRSA reducing LM&B’s fees 
slightly to reflect the 14 non-consenting claimants.67 
  Discovery in the recent case against LM&B has focused on the 
extent to which the lawyers informed their clients of the payment terms 
of the DRSA. 
 LM&B invited the claimants to examine copies of the DRSA but 
except for a small number of “representatives,” did not permit them to 
retain copies.  The lawyers prepared two documents for distribution to 
clients -- the three-page “Individual Agreement” (Ex. A) that they signed 
and another five-page document entitled “Highlights of the Settlement 
Agreement with Nextel”.68  Neither of these documents mentioned the 
amounts or conditions of the payments Nextel was to make to LM&B.   
Both referred to the fact that Nextel had agreed to pay attorneys’ fees but 
did not mention any conflict of interest in connection with this provision.  
(One of these documents refers to the fees as sums “that claimants might 
otherwise have to pay” [Ex. A, par. 3]; the other refers to Nextel’s 
                                                 
67
  DRSA Amendment No. 2, dated February 7-8, 2001. 
68
  Deposition of James Vagnini in the Denver case (Sept. 20, 2006), at 53.  
Highlights of the Settlement Agreement with Nextel, n.d. 
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promise to pay as “consideration” for the claimants’ agreement to accept 
ADR.69)  Both documents mention that Nextel planned to retain LM&B 
after the conclusion of the ADR process and asked the claimants to 
consent to the “conflict of interest” that such retention involved, but 
neither said anything about the nature and effects of the conflict.70 (Ex. 
A, par. 4)  
 Beyond these facts, there is dispute.  The lawyers say that they 
disclosed the amounts of the payments orally to the claimants and that 
they went over the DRSA “line by line” orally with each claimant, 
though it is not clear whether they claim to have done anything more 
than describe the literal terms of the document.71  Some of their former 
clients, however, have asserted they were not told of the amounts and 
conditions of the payments, that they thought that the attorneys’ fee that 
Nextel agreed to pay was the one-third contingency provided in their 
retainers, or that they were told that the purpose of the consultancy was 
to make sure that LM&B could continue to protect them against 
discrimination by Nextel after the ADR process was over.72 
 b.   Claims are “resolved.” 
 Apparently, LM&B was able eventually to bring its clients’ 
claims to sufficient resolution to receive the final attorneys’ fee payment 
under the DRSA and to undertake the “consultancy”.  LM&B and Nextel 
have refused to describe the nature of the work that LM&B has 
performed. 
 c. Aftermath.  Some of LM&B’s former clients have sued them, 
complaining, inter alia, that they did not agree to the payment provisions 
and that they were induced by LM&B to waive rights and settle claims 
against Nextel for less than their value.    
 B. The Ethics Experts  
 Nextel asked Geoffrey Hazard for his opinion on the DRSA 
before it and LM&B signed the agreement.  Hazard gave a four-page 
                                                 
69
  Id. at par.29. 
70
  Id. at par. 30. 
71
  Vagnini deposition, at 53-61; Morelli deposition, at 38-39.   
72
  Deposition of Denise McNeil in the Denver case (July 6, 2006), at I; 92-95; 
Deposition of Alencia Ashton-Moore in the Denver case (November 16, 2005), at I: 72-
83, 120-21; 251-55; Complaint in the federal (originally New Jersey) case (October 23, 
2006), at par.s 28-57. 
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written opinion, which is reprinted here as Appendix II.  Nextel showed 
it to LM&B.73 
 Hazard refers to the DRSA in very general terms.  He mentions 
the provision for Nextel to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses but does not 
refer to the amounts of the fees or their conditions.  He refers to the fees 
and expenses as sums “the Claimants would otherwise be obligated to 
pay” LM&B.  (P.2)  He also mentions the “consultancy”, but again, there 
is no mention of its conditions or the amount of compensation.    Hazard 
notes that the “engagement could benefit present and future Nextel 
employees … by providing objective and experienced guidance in the 
company’s handling of employee relations.” (P.2) 
    Hazard then goes on to express the following opinions: 
    -- There is no violation of the prohibition on restrictions of 
practice.  Professional responsibility rules generally forbid lawyers to 
propose or enter “an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s 
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private 
parties.”74  Hazard opines that the provision in the DRSA precluding 
LM&B from representing or referring other claimants does not violate 
this rule.  As explanation, he says that “representation of Claimants 
under the Agreement could well constitute a conflict of interest with 
other potential clients” and that DRSA contemplates “continuing 
cooperative procedures between Leeds Morelli and Nextel that could be 
jeopardized” by new claims. (P.3) 
 -- Conflicts can be cured by informed consent.  Professional 
responsibility rules preclude a lawyer from proceeding when a 
representation may be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s own interests 
unless two conditions are satisfied.  The first condition is that the lawyer 
must “reasonably believe that the relationship will not be adversely 
affected” by the conflict.  When this condition is satisfied, the conflict is 
said to be “consentable”.  The remaining condition is informed consent, 
or as the rule puts it, “consent… after consultation”.75 
                                                 
73
  LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 28; Deposition in the Denver case of Roy 
Simon (October 19, 2006e), at 18.. 
74
  Model Rule 5.6(b). 
75
  Model Rule 1.7(b).  Hazard also opines that the payment provision does not 
violate Model Rule 1.8(f) which says that a lawyer may not accept payment from 
someone other than the client unless “the client consents after consultation” and there is 
“no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment.”  Since the 
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 Hazard opines without explanation that the conflict presented by 
the payment provisions is “consentable.”  He further states that 
“informed consents should be obtained” but does not discuss what 
informed consent would involve other than to say it must be “adequate” 
and to note, “It is not obligatory that consent of the claimants … be in 
writing, except in a few jurisdictions such as California.”  He states 
further, “I assume that LM&B will provide such disclosure.” (P.3) 
 --   The commitment of clients to stay with LM&B is not legally 
enforceable.  A basic principle of professional responsibility holds that 
the client is always free to discharge the lawyer.76  Responding to the 
DRSA provision that commits the clients to stay with LM&B, Hazard 
says, “The Claimants can make such a commitment on a moral basis but 
it is not legally binding.” (P.4) 
 At about the same time that Nextel consulted Hazard, LM&B 
consulted Roy Simon.  Simon did not put his opinion in writing, but we 
know that he concluded, as Hazard did, that any conflict problems 
associated with the fee provision or the “consultancy” could be cured by 
informed consent.77 
 In a 2003 ABC news story – the only major media coverage of 
the case to date – Nextel was reported as responding to allegations by 
former LM&B clients that the DRSA had “sold them out” that “the 
agreement had been reviewed and approved by a nationally-known 
ethics expert.”78 
 In connection with one of the lawsuits by former LM&B clients, 
Nextel retained, in addition to Hazard, a practitioner professional 
responsibility expert, and LM&B retained, in addition to Roy Simon, 
Bruce Green and a practitioner expert.  In the lengthy written pre-trial 
disclosure of the testimony of these experts in one of the pending cases,79 
                                                                                                                       
issues presented by this rule are virtually the same as those presented by Rule 1.7(b), I 
do not discuss them separately. 
76
  Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 31, Comment d. 
77
  Roy Simon deposition, at 11-22. 
78
  Story by Sarah Wallace, WABC-TV (New York), November 4, 2003.  (DVD 
copy on file with author). 
79
  References to the experts pretrial opinions are to the following documents in  
the Denver case: (1) Defendant Nextel Communications, Inc.s Supplemental C.R.C.P. 
26(a)(2)(B)(I) and (II) Expert Witness Disclosures [hereafter "Nextel Disclosure"];  (2) 
Defendants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli, Jeffrey 
Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Expert Endorsement Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 
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Hazard re-affirmed his opinion;80 the four other experts agreed with 
Hazard on most or all of the conclusions expressed in his letter, and none 
indicated disagreement with him on anything.81  In addition, Roy Simon, 
Green, and the practitioner experts, on the basis of some assumed 
version of the defendants’ story, opined that LM&B’s disclosure to its 
clients was adequate for informed consent.82  And they opined that $5.5 
million was a reasonable fee for the work that LM&B engaged to 
perform.83 
 A notable feature of the ex post litigation opinions is the way 
they build on the authority of Hazard’s and Roy Simon’s ex ante 
opinions.   Three experts state that it was “appropriate” for Nextel and 
LM&B to seek ethics advice prior to entering into the DRSA.84  (No one 
disputes that point, but clearly the defendants plan to remind the jury of 
these consultations as often as possible.)  Some go further and suggest 
that the ex ante opinions have weight on substantive questions.  Bruce 
Green opines that the fact that Nextel “retained Professor Hazard to 
review the DRSA as well [i.e., in addition to LM&B’s retention of Roy 
Simon] was an additional basis for [LM&B] to conclude that the DRSA 
was appropriate and ethical.”85  LM&B’s practitioner expert goes even 
farther, contending that Roy Simon’s opinion is “evidence” of 
consentability and that “because [Nextel] retained Professor Hazard to 
                                                                                                                       
26(a)(2)(b) [hereafter "LM&B Disclosure"]; (3) LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, cited 
in note  ; and (4) Defendants Leeds Morelli & Brown', P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven 
Morelli, Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Second Supplemental 
Summary of Expert Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(4) [hereafter "LM&B 
Second Supplemental Disclosure"]. 
80
  Nextel disclosures at 7. 
81
  Agreement with Hazard: Nextel disclosure, at 4-6 (Richard Hennessey); 
LM&B Disclosure, at 3 (Roy Simon, 5-6 (Bruce Green), LM&B Supplemental 
Disclosure, at 7-8 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 23-29 (Jean 
Dubofsky). 
82
  Informed consent: Nextel disclosures, at 5 (Hennessey); LM&B Supplemental 
Disclosure, at 8 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 17 (Green); LM&B 
Supplemental Disclosure, at 25-26 (Dubofsky). 
83
  Fee: Nextel Disclosures, at 4-5 (Hennessey); 7 (Dubofsky); LM&B 
Supplemental Disclosure, at 9 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 26 
(Dubofsky). 
84
  Nextel disclosure, at 3 (Roy Simon), 6 (Green), 7 (Dubofsky). 
85
  Second Supplemental Disclosure, at 16.  
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review the DRSA as well, it was reasonable for LM&B to conclude that 
the DRSA was appropriate and ethical.”86 
 On two issues, the practitioner experts seem to rest their views 
largely or entirely on Hazard’s opinion.  Nextel’s practitioner expert 
gives Hazard’s opinion as a reason why the prohibition on representation 
of other clients was permissible.87  Concluding that the consultancy 
agreement was not a prohibited restriction on practice, LM&B’s 
practitioner expert gives as the only basis for her opinion the fact that 
Hazard said it was not.88 
  C. Critique 
 It  should be sufficient to raise doubts about both the practitioner 
and the academic practices involved in this case to point out some salient 
deficiencies in Hazard’s written opinion and to make a few specific 
comments about Green’s and Roy Simon’s contributions.  One reason to 
focus on Hazard is that his opinion has been most influential.  Another is 
that it is a self-contained statement, intended and used as a basis for 
practical decision.  By contrast, I know the other experts’ views only 
from summaries of their anticipated trial testimony.  Although these 
summaries are each considerably longer than Hazard’s opinion, they are 
not exhaustive.89 
                                                 
86
  LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 23. 
 Doctrine suggests that reliance of advice of another has at most limited bearing  
in determining whether a lawyer has fulfilled professional responsibilities.  See Model 
Rule 5.2(b) (“subordinate lawyer” does not violate rules if she acts in accordance with 
supervisor’s “reasonable resolution" of an arguable professional duty); Florida Bar v. 
St. Louis, 2007 WL 1285836 (May 3, 2007) (rejecting advice of counsel defense to bar 
disciplinary charges); People v. Katz, 58 P..2d 1176, 1187 (Colorado P.D.J. 2002) 
(same). 
87
  Nextel disclosure, at 6. 
88
   
   Ms. Dubofsky will explain that Nextel retained Geoffrey Hazard to evaluate and 
opine upon the ethical implications of the consultancy arrangement with LM&B, 
that Professor Hazard concluded that the arrangement was ethical, and that LM&B 
reviewed his written opinion before entering the provisions.  Ms. Dubofsky will 
opine that under these circumstances, the DRSA’s consulting provision is ethical 
and appropriate, and within the standard of care for lawyers practicing in 
Colorado in 2000. 
LM&B's  Supplemental Disclosure, at 28.  Hennessey also gives strong weight to 
Hazard's opinion in this issue.  Nextel disclosures, at 5. 
89
  Roy Simon and Green testified at the trial in the Denver case in November, 
2007, that resulted in a verdict for defendants.  I have not seen any reports of their 
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 1. Conflicts 
 a. The Elephant in the Room 
 Hazard’s opinion is patently wrong on nearly every issue it 
addresses, but its most remarkable feature – shared by the opinions of the 
four other experts – is its complete silence on the nature of the conflict 
created by the payment arrangements of the DRSA.  The DRSA was 
extraordinary in two respects.  First, the plaintiffs’ lawyers concluded 
negotiation of compensation for themselves from their clients’ adversary 
without even beginning to negotiate relief for their clients.90  Second, the 
compensation they negotiated did not depend on either the lawyers’ 
efforts or their results. 
 One way to start thinking about the two requirements of the 
conflict of interest rule – consentability and consent – is to ask: if this 
conflict were consentable, what kind of disclosure would have to be 
made to the client?  The most important section of any adequate 
disclosure of the DRSA would go something like this: 
 The DRSA provides for Nextel to make payments to us totaling 
$7.5 million.  In order to earn this money, we do not have to achieve any 
particular result for you.  What we have to do to get paid is, first, to 
persuade you and the other claimants to accept the DRSA, and second, 
to get your claim and the others resolved in the ADR procedure in 
accordance with deadlines set down by Nextel  As long as we get the 
claims resolved in time, we get paid regardless of whether you get a 
large award or whether you default and get nothing (and under the 
procedure, you can default if, for example, you miss a meeting without 
an excuse).   
 We get our first $2 million from Nextel when we deliver signed 
individual agreements from every one of you.  The DRSA permits Nextel 
                                                                                                                       
testimony.  Hazard did not testify because the claims against Nextel had been dismissed 
prior to the trial. 
90
  Courts that have considered the practice of simultaneously negotiating 
recovery and fees have accepted it only with discomfort and qualification.  For 
example, a notable decision says that the “better practice” is to negotiate recovery 
before discussing fees and that simultaneously negotiated settlements should be 
subjected to “careful scrutiny.”  Cisek v. National Surface Cleaning,Inc., 954 F. Supp. 
110, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  That was a class action, and thus the court’s approval was 
required for settlement.  Our case – where the fees were negotiated before the recovery 
– involved informal aggregation of claims that were never filed in court, and hence 
there was no opportunity for any kind of public scrutiny. 
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to deny us all payment if we fail to persuade any of you to accept the 
DRSA.91  So when we counsel you about whether to accept the DRSA, we 
will have a $7.5 million stake in getting you to agree.  Although we will 
do our best to exercise independent judgment in your interests, there is a 
risk that this financial interest will affect our advice.   
 After the $2 million we receive when everyone agrees to the 
DRSA, we get $1.5 million when half of the claims have been resolved, 
and another $2 million when all claims have been resolved.  When all 
the claims have been resolved, Nextel is going to hire us to work for it 
for two years and pay us $2 million more.  We will be doing whatever 
work they assign us, and it will not necessarily be in your interest. 
 The DRSA provides that all claims should be resolved within 45   
weeks of the start of the process.  If we fail to meet this deadline, Nextel 
can reduce payments to us, and it is possible it could decline to hire us 
and pay us the final $2 million. 
 If you accept the DRSA, we will make our best efforts to pursue 
your claims zealously and to exercise independent judgment in advising 
you on whether to accept settlement offers and in preparing your case.  
However, since it requires less effort and expense for us to settle quickly 
than to prepare, negotiate, and try your case, and since every time we 
turn down a settlement offer, we increase the risk of missing the deadline 
and incurring a large financial loss, there is a risk that our advice and 
strategic decisions will be affected by our financial interests. 
 b. Consentability 
 All of the defense experts say the conflict was consentable, but 
none of them say a word about what standards they apply for this 
judgment.  Their silence does not reflect the existence of standards too 
well known to require mention.  In fact, there is little authority on when a 
conflict is consentable.  However, there can be no doubt that some 
arrangements are not consentable (at least in all jurisdictions relevant to 
this case).  This case seems an especially good candidate for non-
consentability. 
                                                 
91
  As things turned out, Nextel agreed to accept LM&B’s tender of 573 consents 
in return for LM&B’s agreement to lower its fee to reflect the 14 hold outs.  DRSA, 
Amendment 2.  LM&B might have anticipated that Nextel would accept consents from 
less than all the claimants, but it could not have been sure of any such leniency – the 
concession required negotiation of an amendment to the DRSA -- and it seems unlikely 
that failure with respect to more than a small fraction would be excused. 
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 The most critical considerations are these:   
 The alignment between lawyer incentives and client interests is 
especially bad.  All compensation arrangements involve conflicts 
between lawyer and client interests, but the divergence here is much 
worse than with the percentage contingency of the original deal.   
 Further, the arrangement is highly unusual. 92  The customary use 
of an arrangement in a particular context suggests similarly situated 
clients have decided that it is a good thing.  A non-customary 
arrangement lacks this reassurance.   
 In addition, the benefits are hard to assess (or even perceive).  
What did the claimants get for giving up the one-third contingency and 
accepting the much worse incentives of the fixed fee?  The disclosure 
documents implied that the fee provision was a boon to the claimants 
because it relieved them of the obligation to pay the fee themselves out 
of their recoveries.93  However, under their original agreement, the 
claimants would have been compensated for this expense by the statutory 
fee award that successful discrimination plaintiffs receive.94 In any 
event, the assertion that the claimants benefited by being relieved of their 
fee obligation merely raises the question of why Nextel would not have 
been willing to pay fees based on a percentage of the recoveries.95  It’s 
                                                 
92
  Flat-rate compensation is not unknown, but in the civil sphere it is usually 
found in situations involving either (1) routine transactions, such as uncontested 
divorces or consumer bankruptcies, or (2) situations where there is a long-term relation 
between sophisticated business clients and their lawyers.  
93
  DRSA, Ex. A, par 3.  Green asserts that the fee arrangement was "a benefit to 
LM&B's clients" for this reason.  LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 17.  
94
  See e.g., 56 U.S.C. 2305(a).  Unless the agreement specifies otherwise, fee 
awards go entirely to the client, and the contingency fee percentage is applied only to 
the damage award.  Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers sec. 38, Comment (d).  
The agreements (retainers) with LM&B that I (and presumably, Green and Roy Simon) 
have seen did not specify otherwise.   
95
  Roy Simon does make a response to this query, but it seems more a 
hypothetical debating point than a reasoned conclusion: 
Professor Simon will explain to the jury the positive effect on an adversary such 
as Nextel in terms of a 'cap' on attorneys' fee exposure and how such an 
arrangement can result in higher settlements paid to claimants.   
 LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 8. 
 As opposed to the alternative of Nextel agreeing to pay the one-third attorneys' 
fee contingency of the original retainers, capping attorneys' fees  but not damages 
eliminated the variance with respect to only a quarter of the expected value of Nextel's 
exposure.  Even if Nextel was so risk averse that it valued this trivial reduction in risk -- 
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an even larger mystery what the claimants got for agreeing to accept the 
perverse incentives of the consultancy arrangement.  The only possible 
answer is that they got Nextel’s agreement to the ADR process, but the 
process seems at least as much in Nextel’s interest as in the claimants’.  
 Finally, the clients were legally unsophisticated, and it thus 
seems appropriate to apply the paternalistic constraints that the rule 
clearly contemplates to them.   
 An adequate analysis of consentability should also take account 
of four other features of the agreement that exacerbated the risks created 
by the skewed incentives.  First, the confidentiality provisions meant 
there would be no publicity about the results.  A substantial motivation 
for lawyers is often the desire to enhance their reputations through 
reports of successful representation, and conversely, to avoid injury to 
reputation by reports of bad practice.  This motivation could not operate 
here. 
 Second, the confidentiality provisions precluded the claimants 
from talking to each other.  Thus, they could not compare results or talk 
about concerns they had about their lawyers.  This removed for each 
client a major source of information that would otherwise have been 
available to assist in assessing the lawyers’ performance.   
 Third, two unusual features of the agreement reduced the 
likelihood that a professional less beholden than LM&B to Nextel would 
intervene on behalf of the claimants.  The fee provision required LM&B 
to bear the expense out of its own compensation of any expert witness 
for the claimant and thus created a strong disincentive to bringing one in.  
                                                                                                                       
which seems highly unlikely in the case of a company sold for $35 billion in 2005 -- it 
is hard to see how it could have compensated the claimants for it.  It did not agree to 
pay any minimum amount to the claimants in the DRSA, and once the DRSA was 
concluded, it had no incentive to offer any further concessions. 
 Roy Simon makes one more, equally implausible argument for claimant 
benefit: 
Professor Simon will explain how the [flat rate] arrangement greatly benefits a 
client and allows the lawyer to focus on the merits of the client’s claims rather 
than have concern over compensation for the lawyers themselves.   
 LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 8. 
All payment arrangements “allow” the lawyer to focus on the client’s claims; the 
objection to the flat rate is that it minimizes his material interest in doing so. 
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Another provision forbade LM&B from bringing in any lawyers from 
outside the firm to work on the cases.  
 Fourth, resort to ADR precluded review of the results by a public 
official.  Had the claims been asserted in a class action, a settlement 
would have been likely to require approval by a judge or public official.  
By inducing the claimants’ to waive their rights to class actions, the 
DSRA required them to give up this safeguard. 
 These four concerns would not have created insuperable conflict 
problems by themselves.  However, they increased the clients’ 
dependence on their lawyers’ loyalty and capacity for independent 
judgment, just as the financial provisions of the DRSA were 
undermining that capacity.   
 In failing to explain its conclusion about consentability, Hazard's 
opinion violates the norm requiring analytical support. 
 c. Consent After Consultation 
 I have already suggested the most important component of 
disclosure that would have been necessary.  There are strong indications 
that such disclosure was not given.  The written documents prepared for 
client disclosure do not mention the amount or conditions of the 
payments and contain no discussion of conflicts other than a conclusory 
reference with respect to the consultancy.  Claimants in the actions 
against LM&B alleged that such disclosure was never given.  
Unfortunately, the record is unclear as to what the lawyers claim to have 
said orally because both their testimony on this point and the 
characterizations of their exonerating experts describe the oral 
consultation only in conclusory terms, such as “line-by-line,” and “in 
detail.”  Nevertheless, without getting into the factual disputes, we can 
make the following points about the experts’ performance on this issue. 
 Hazard’s letter simply assumes the issue away, noting that there 
must be informed consent, but saying nothing about what it should 
involve.  Surely, this was not because Hazard thought the required 
disclosure obvious.  Hazard knows that “in the process of obtaining 
informed consent, the lawyer or law firm must do more than merely 
disclose the relevant facts; it must evaluate and analyze the conflict and 
advise the party of the wisdom of consenting.”96  Aside from the issue of 
                                                 
96
  Geoffrey C. Hazard and William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 10-23 (3d ed. 
2000).   
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consentability, the issue of required disclosure was the most difficult 
issue and the issue with the greatest practical stakes that was presented 
by Nextel’s inquiry. 
 Yet, Hazard had only one thing to say about it: “It is not 
obligatory that the consents of the claimants be in writing…”  (P. 3) This 
was true, but, as the letter noted, irrelevant because the lawyers intended 
to get consent in writing.  Hazard ignored the more important question of 
whether the disclosure necessary to effective consent should have been 
in writing.  The rule does not require written disclosure invariably, but it 
does require whatever disclosure is necessary “to permit the client to 
appreciate the significance of the matter in question.”97  Where the 
material is as complicated as it is here, that standard would require 
written disclosure.98 
 Hazard violated the norm of reasonable framing by ignoring the 
key issues regarding consent, and by emphasizing the rule’s flexibility 
on an irrelevant issue, he sent the wrong signal.  He had seen documents 
suggesting a reluctance to come clean about the payment arrangements.  
(Recall that the DRSA never mentions the total payments and that the 
Individual Agreement form in the appendix contains no numbers at all or 
any explanation of payment conditions.)  Telling the lawyers that the rule 
is flexible about whether consents have to be in writing was like telling a 
drunk getting into the driver’s seat that he’s allowed to turn right on a red 
light – true, but not the message he needs to hear. 
 Finally, to show how easily expertise can lapse into advocacy, I 
note that both Roy Simon and Bruce Green opine that it was sufficient 
disclosure simply to permit the claimants to examine a copy of the (50-
page, obscurely written) DRSA.99  Surely this is an eccentric 
understanding of “consultation.” 
 2. Other Issues 
                                                 
97
  ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Terminology (“Consultation”). 
98
  Model Rule 1.5(b) – not mentioned by Hazard – provides that “the basis or 
rate of the fee” should be communicated to a new client “preferably in writing.” 
99
   
 Professor Green will opine that the fact that Plaintiffs personally received a 
copy of the DRSA that they were able to review before they attended their 
mediations, depositions, prepared for arbitrations, and before they executed their 
general releases, amounts to full disclosure. 
 LM&B Supplemental Summary, at 17.  This view is attributed to Roy Simon 
in identical language at 8. 
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 Not all of the following issues are practically important in the 
case at hand, but I include them as further illustrations of the effects of 
market and adversarial pressures on putatively neutral judgment.  With 
respect to each issue, Hazard failed either to provide analytical support 
or to frame reasonably. 
 1. Reasonableness of the fee. 
 Hazard ignored the issues presented by the DRSA of compliance 
with the rule that requires that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable” and 
that the basis of the fee be disclosed to the client.100  The four other 
litigation experts all opine that $5.5 million was a reasonable fee for 
LM&B’s work, citing the LM&B lawyers’ experience and the number of 
hours they claim to have spent on the case.101 
 However, they do not mention a serious problem with such a 
claim.  It is virtually unheard of to assess the reasonableness of a fee for 
representation in a civil damage action without any knowledge of either 
the expected value of the claims or the actual recovery.  Yet, it appears 
that the experts do not have this information because the lawyers have 
been intent on keeping it secret.  The experts do not know whether the 
attorneys’ fee represents 10 percent of the amount LM&B expected to or 
did recover for their clients or 10 times that amount.  Surely, under the 
circumstances their opinions cannot be taken seriously. 
 At the time the DRSA was presented, a similar problem affected 
disclosure to the clients.  The fee was an aggregate sum for 
representation of all 587 claims.  In order to assess its reasonableness (if 
it had been disclosed), the clients would have needed some sense of the 
expected aggregate value of the claims.  Yet, not only were the clients 
not provided with any information about claims other than their own, 
they were forbidden to seek such information.  Accordingly, the fee 
arrangement should be considered unreasonable in form because it did 
not permit the clients to make a meaningful decision about the 
reasonableness of its amount. 
 2. The clients’ commitment to stay with LM&B. 
 The DRSA provided that, “Each claimant agrees that LM&B 
shall be his/her legal representative throughout the” ADR process. (Par. 
7(a); Ex. A, par 1)   Hazard notes that this is inconsistent with the 
                                                 
100
  Model Rule 1.5(a),(b). 
101
  See note   above. 
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principle that client is always free to discharge the lawyer.  He then says 
only: “The Claimants can make such a commitment on a moral basis but 
it is not legally binding.” (P.4)  Hazard nowhere mentions the lawyers’ 
duty to “fairly disclose the client’s alternatives” with respect to choice of 
counsel.102  Indeed the knowing inclusion of unenforceable terms in 
contracts has been held unlawful deception even in arm’s length 
relations.103 
 3. The agreement not to accept or refer other claims. 
 Hazard opined that the DRSA provision prohibiting LM&B from 
representing or referring other claimants did not violate the rule against 
agreement to a “restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice [as] part of 
the settlement of a controversy between private parties.”104  Hazard 
explained that the additional representation “could” involve a prohibited 
conflict.  (P.3) 
 In fact, there was no reason to presume that additional 
representation would involve a conflict,105 and even if such a conflict 
were certain, Hazard’s conclusion would not follow.  Rule 5.6(b) makes 
no exception for situations where the agreement to restrict practice 
would have no practical effect because the practice in question would be 
independently prohibited.  If it had been clear that the conflicts rules 
would prohibit LM&B from representing or referring other claimants, 
there would have been no point to the DRSA restriction.  The only 
possible point of the DRSA restriction was to assure Nextel that, should 
it prove otherwise permissible for LM&B to represent or refer future 
                                                 
102
  ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, F. 
Op. 99-414. 
103
  E.g., Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 156-57 (1985). 
104
  Model Rule 5.6(b) 
105
  As support for this claim, Hazard offered only citations to Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1997). Neither case has any clear relevance to the Nextel situation.  In both, the 
conflicts concerns arose because clients were differently situated in substantive or 
strategic terms (for example, clients with present as opposed to only potential future 
claims; class member clients v. individual claimants), and in both there was at least a 
background concern that the assets available to satisfy the claims were limited so that 
the gains of one group would only come at the expense of another.  In our case, there 
was no reason to think that new claimants would be differently situated or that their 
claims would affect the amount available for LM&B’s original clients. 
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claimants against it, the firm would refuse to do so.  Such assurance is 
precisely what the rule is designed to prohibit. 
 Hazard also says, “the Agreement contemplates continuing 
cooperative procedures between LM&B that could be jeopardized if the 
law firm pursued litigation on terms inconsistent with the Agreement.” 
(P.3)  Is this any different from arguing that “the agreement does not 
violate the rule because enforcement of the rule would be inconsistent 
with the agreement”?  In any event, the reference to “collaborative 
procedures between LM&B and Nextel” as something deserving an 
exemption from the usual requirements should send a chill down the 
spine of anyone more sensitive to the dangers posed by this collaboration 
to LM&B’s clients.  
 4. The “consultancy” as a restriction on practice 
 As we have seen, the main problem with the “consultancy” is that 
by negotiating a future engagement with the client’s adversary before 
negotiating the clients’ claims, LM&B created a huge conflict of interest.  
But the agreement is also arguably a “restriction on the lawyer’s right to 
practice” prohibited by Model Rule 5.6(b).  This is one issue on which 
LM&B’s position is defensible, but I mention it because it involves an 
interesting question.  
 The usual rationale for the rule is a kind of public utility principle 
that holds that the lawyer should not without good reason limit his 
availability to people in need of legal services.  There also seems to be a 
notion that it is unjust and perhaps extortion-like for the lawyer or even 
the lawyer’s current client to take money in return for the lawyer not 
asserting claims against the payor.106 
 It is an interesting issue whether the rule is violated when, instead 
of agreeing not to bring claims against the adversary in the future, the 
lawyer agrees to represent the adversary in the future.  Such provisions 
are common and have been held permissible as part of the settlement of 
the original client’s claims (though not before settlement of these 
claims).107  The rationale for allowing them is that the rule is not 
                                                 
106
 See ABA F. Op. 93-371 (1993) (noting that one purpose of the rule is to 
prevent “the use of such agreements to provide clients with rewards that bear less 
relationship to the merits of the case than they do to the desire of the defendant to ‘buy 
off’ plaintiff’s counsel’).  For discussion, see Luban, cited in note    , at  
107
   Compare Stephen Gillers, "Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue 
Promises in Settlement Agreements," 18 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 291 
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intended to prohibit limitations of practice that arise by virtue of 
representation. 
 Of course, the objection to this view is that the effect of such 
agreements is similar to an outright restriction.  Once the lawyer 
represents the (now former) adversary, he will be conflicted out of 
adverse representations.  In most cases, it seems unlikely that the 
adversary has any other purpose in retaining the plaintiffs’ lawyer.  
Plaintiffs’ and defense bars in the tort and employment areas are quite 
specialized, and businesses rarely retain plaintiffs’ lawyers under other 
circumstances.  Indeed, one of LM&B’s experts candidly expresses her 
understanding that Nextel’s reason for entering into the “consultancy” 
was to preclude LM&B from further adverse representations.108 
 Many lawyers are untroubled by these provisions, even though 
broadly permitting them would virtually nullify the prohibition against 
restrictions on practice in settlements.  They are not troubled by 
nullification because they see the policies behind the rule as weak.  The 
idea of the lawyer as a public utility seems anachronistic or Utopian to 
them.  Moreover, they take the view that was until recently a dogma 
among federal judges that any practice that promotes settlement carries a 
large presumption of legitimacy.  And they emphasize how difficult it 
would be to enforce a rule that turned on the motivation of the initially 
adverse party in asking for the arrangement. 
 My view is that the policies behind the rule are at least strong 
enough to support an interpretation that would preclude the lawyer from 
negotiation of subsequent retention with an adversary until after the 
conclusion of the initial representation.109  This interpretation would be 
desirable independently on conflicts grounds, would not be hard to 
apply, and would screen out some pretextual agreements.  It would 
impede settlement only where settlement would be likely to violate the 
policies of the rule – that is, where settlement is possible only where the 
defendant offers terms that reflect, not just her valuation of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, but also the deterrence of future claims.   
                                                                                                                       
(2005), (criticizing rule), with David A. Dana and Susan P. Koniak, "Secret Settlements 
and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms," 2003 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1217, 1222-24 (defending rule). 
108
  Defendant’s Supplemental Summary, at 28.   
109
  This position was adopted in In re Conduct of Brandt, 10 P.3d 906, 919-20 
(Or. 2000). 
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 It would not have been unreasonable for Hazard to reject this 
view, but a responsible appraisal of the DRSA would have at least 
addressed it. 
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 
 The defining characteristics of quasi-third-party legal advice – 
the absence of a strong duty of care to the ultimate addressees and 
secrecy – create a market for bad legal advice.  Of course, the market 
does not invariably produce bad advice, but it consistently encourages 
bad advice. 
 The market for bad legal advice is a problem for professional and 
academic morality.  Professional responsibility norms are designed to 
encourage demand for and reliance on legal advice by prescribing 
safeguards that deter bad advice.  However, these norms have largely 
been pre-occupied with first party advice, and to a smaller extent, 
traditional explicit third-party advice.  However, quasi-third-party advice 
involves the kinds of stakes that have traditionally motivated 
professional regulation.  The advisor invokes the authority of the 
profession to encourage reliance that has public consequences.  The 
social value of good legal advice is usually understood in terms of 
enforcement or vindication of law.  Bad advice tends to impair 
enforcement and vindication and to undermine the status and authority of 
the profession. 
 When academics give quasi-third-party advice, there is a parallel 
problem for the academy.  Academic norms focus on conduct with 
respect to scholarship.  Quasi-third-party advice usually does not take the 
form of scholarship.  However, it characteristically invokes the 
reputation of the University in order to encourage public reliance, and 
this reliance often has significant public consequences.  Quasi-third-
party practice is thus in tension with academic norms holding that 
openness, and especially exposure to peer criticism, is a fundamental 
safeguard of the soundness conclusions. 
 Among several possible responses to these problems, the most 
promising focus on norms of transparency.  Transparency could be 
imposed in the form of conditions on desired third-party effects, or it 
could be imposed as academic or professional practice rules.   The article 
leaves open the question of whether formal, coercive enforcement would 
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be desirable.  Even enforced only through informal criticism and 
shaming, professional and academic transparency requirements could 
have significant effects. 
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[Transcribed] 
 
 
 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM 
 CHARLES FRANK KRAVIS SR.  
 CORNELL LAW SCHOOL 
 10_ MYRON TAYLOR HALL TELEPHONE: (607) 255-9668   
 ITHACA, NEW YORK 14853 TELECOPIER:  (607) 255-7193 
 
 
 
 March 13, 2002 
 
John K. Villa, Esq. 
Williams & Connolly LLP 
725 Twelfth Street N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005-5901 
 
Dear Mr. Villa: 
 
I have been asked for my opinion on the question whether Vinson & Elkins acted 
appropriately in undertaking for Enron a preliminary investigation of the concerns raised 
by an Enron employee, Sherron Watkins.  I enclose my professional resume.  In my 
opinion, Vinson & Elkins acted both properly and ethically,  At your request, I am basing 
my opinion on the facts set forth in the “Powers Report” (the Report of the Special 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron) and in Vinson & Elkins’ report of its 
investigation by letter of October 15, 2001. 
 
Ms. Watkins recommended in a letter to CEO Ken Lay that Enron conduct an 
independent legal and accounting investigation of a number of allegations.  She 
suggested that Vinson & Elkins not be hired to conduct the investigation because, as she 
believed, the law firm had provided “true sale” opinions in some of the transactions that 
she thought should be investigated. 
 
A corporate investigation utilizing independent counsel and an independent auditing firm 
is a major undertaking.  A corporation does not necessarily undertake a full scale 
independent investigation each time an employee raises a complaint about corporate 
conduct or the propriety of the corporation’s accounting.  Before initiating such an 
independent investigation, it is customary and appropriate for a corporation to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry to determine whether such an independent investigation is warranted.  
From my review of Vinson & Elkins’ report of October 15, 2001 and the Powers Report, 
it is clear that the law firm undertook and conducted a preliminary inquiry and not the 
type of full independent investigation that Ms Watkins requested, and that such an 
inquiry was precisely what its client, Enron, had requested. 
 
APPENDIX I 
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The standard for determining whether Vinson & Elkins could undertake such a 
preliminary investigation was whether the law firm had a conflict of interest under the 
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.  To answer that question, it is 
necessary to examine the specific issues that Enron asked Vinson & Elkins to investigate. 
 
The Powers Report states that Ms. Watkins “raised serious questions concerning the 
accounting treatment and economic substance” of certain transactions, p. 172.  According 
to CEO Lay, as noted in the Powers Report, Ms. Watkins’ major focus was Raptor, a 
series of transactions on which Enron faced an impending credit problem in 2002 and 
2003.  As quoted in the Powers Report, Ms. Watkins’ letter also stated that “Enron has 
been very aggressive in its accounting – most notably in the Raptor transactions.”  
Powers Report p. 172 (quoting letter). 
 
The purpose of Vinson & Elkins’ preliminary investigation was to determine whether 
Ms. Watkins had raised issues sufficient to warrant a full-scale investigation of the nature 
that she had suggested.  As agreed with Enron, Vinson & Elkins’ “review would not 
include questioning the accounting transactions.”  Powers Report p. 173.  “Instead, 
Vinson & Elkins would conduct a ‘preliminary investigation’ which was defined as 
determining whether the facts raised by Watkins warranted further independent legal or 
accounting review,” p. 173.  Vinson & Elkins could reasonably agree to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry of this nature and scope. 
 
My review of Ms. Watkins’ letter, the Powers Report, and the Vinson & Elkins report 
establishes that, as agreed with its client, Vinson & Elkins’ investigation focused on 
whether Ms. Watkins had raised new facts regarding the issues of business and 
accounting judgment cited in her letter and supplementary materials, not on the quality of 
the legal work previously performed for Enron by Vinson & Elkins.  There was no 
conflict of interest for Vinson & Elkins to undertake such an investigation because it 
would not be sitting in judgment of its own legal services. 
 
Enron’s annual payment of millions in legal fees for many matters to Vinson & Elkins 
over an extended period prior to the time of the investigation did not create a conflict of 
interest for Vinson & Elkins.  It is quite common for companies to call on their primary 
outside counsel with whom they do the most work in such circumstances.  This 
investigation was not a full “independent counsel” investigation in the sense, for 
example, of the investigation conducted by the lawyers who assisted in preparing the 
Powers Report.  Neither Enron nor Vinson & Elkins regarded it as such an “independent 
counsel” investigation, and that was reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Although Vinson & Elkins has been criticized for accepting the word of the people it 
interviewed in the investigation, it bears noting that Vinson & Elkins, like any lawyer, 
may properly assume that its client is telling the truth absent evidence to the contrary.  
Vinson & Elkins could also rely on the accountants, Board members, employees, and 
officers who knew of the transactions and the accounting treatment of the transactions. 
 
In summary, it is my opinion based on the Powers Report and Vinson & Elkins’ Report 
that: 
 
• There was no conflict of interest in Vinson & Elkins’ conducting a preliminary 
inquiry into the concerns raised by Sherron Watkins. 
 
• Enron and Vinson & Elkins could properly limit the preliminary inquiry to 
whether the facts justified a full scale “independent” investigation. 
 
• The fact that Vinson & Elkins had previously earned millions of dollars in fees 
from Enron did not disqualify it from ethically conducting a preliminary 
investigation of the kind often performed by the main outside counsel for 
corporations. 
 
• Vinson & Elkins could properly accept the word of the officers of its client and 
rely on the judgment of the accountants, Board members, employees, and officers 
in reaching its conclusions. 
 
• It would be highly unusual for a law firm in the position of Vinson & Elkins to 
decline in these circumstances to undertake such a preliminary investigation on 
ethical grounds.  It is customary for clients like Enron to turn to large law firms 
that are acquainted with the company’s business and transactions to conduct 
preliminary investigations and make recommendations, such as Vinson & Elkins 
was asked to do here. 
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CHARLES W. WOLFRAM 
 
• I find no breach of any ethical rule by Vinson & Elkins in accepting and 
conducting the preliminary review of the concerns raised by Sherron  
      Watkins. 
 
 
 Very truly yours, 
  
 Charles W. Wolfram 
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[Transcribed] 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. 
 
 
TRUSTEE PROFESSOR OF LAW CONSULTING OFFICE ADDRESS 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 513 CEDAR LANE 
2300 CHESTNUT STREET SWARTHMORE, PA 19081 
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104 TELEPHONE:  610-544-4550 
TELEPHONE:  215-898-7494 September 28, 2000 FAX: 610-544-5083 
 
Mary Elizabeth McGarry, Esq. 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
425 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10017-3954 
 
Re:  Nextel Communications, Inc. 
 
Dear Ms. McGarry: 
 
 This responds to your request for my opinion concerning the 
propriety, under the rules of professional ethics in New York, Virginia and 
other jurisdictions, of the arrangement set forth in the September 28, 2000 
Draft Confidential agreement, and related proposed documentation 
(collectively, “Agreement”), a copy of which you have sent me. 
 The proposed Agreement includes a detailed Alternative Dispute 
Resolution procedure for resolving claims by claimants (“Claimants”) of 
employment discrimination in employment or application for employment 
with Nextel Communications, Inc. and its affiliates (“Nextel”) who are 
represented by the law firm of Leeds Morelli & Brown (“Leeds Morelli”).  
Several hundred Claimants are involved.  The Agreement calls for processing 
the claims of the Claimants on a measured but expedited basis, through a 
dispute resolution process involving an interview and negotiation, mediation 
if necessary and binding arbitration if necessary.  The Agreement 
contemplates that Leeds Morelli and Nextel will proceed cooperatively to 
process the claims, including mutual exchange of information concerning  
the claims, through the three-stage procedure, culminating in an agreed-upon 
resolution or a determination though arbitration and a General Release by  
any Claimant receiving any award. 
 Under the Agreement, Nextel will pay to Leeds Morelli agreed 
amounts in lieu of the attorneys’ fees and expenses that the Claimants would 
otherwise be obligated to pay Leeds Morelli. 
APPENDIX II 
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 The Agreement further expresses the intention of Leeds Morelli not 
to accept representation of other persons with similar claims against Nextel 
outside the framework of the Agreement, and obligates Leeds Morelli to 
refrain from referring to other lawyers’ prospective claimants who may 
inquire with Leeds Morelli. 
 The parties believe that the dispute resolution process will benefit 
both the Claimants and Nextel.  The fee to be paid the law firm takes account 
of the fact that the firm will have to engage in a large and expensive staffing 
arrangement in order to present and process the claims on the expedited 
basis. 
 In addition, the Agreement calls for engagement of Leeds Morelli by 
Nextel, after completion of the dispute resolution process for all of the 
Claimants represented by Leeds Morelli, to serve as a consultant and provide 
assistance and legal advice with regard to equal employment and affirmative 
action matters.  Nextel, which is presently an adversary of these Claimants, 
will thereupon become a client of the firm representing the Claimants.  This 
engagement can benefit present and future Nextel employees, as well as 
Nextel itself, by providing objective and experienced guidance in the 
company’s handling of employee relations. 
 The Agreement has other provisions concerning the arrangements 
among Claimants, Leeds Morelli and Nextel, some of which are noted  
below. 
 The Agreement contemplates that the payment by Nextel to Leeds 
Morelli of an amount of attorneys fees and expenses will be disclosed to the 
Claimants and their consent obtained.   Such a disclosure and informed 
consent is required.  See New York DR 5-107(a), the provisions of which 
correspond to counterpart rules in Virginia, Va. Code of Prof.  
Responsibility, Rule 1.8(f), and all other jurisdictions.  See American Bar 
Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(f).  I assume 
that Leeds Morelli has and will continue to exercise independent  
professional judgment on behalf of the Claimants, in reaching and 
implementing the Agreement.  On that basis, and upon disclosure and 
informed consent, the payments arrangement is in my opinion compatible 
with the foregoing ethical standards. 
 The contemplated agreement whereby Leeds Morelli will refrain from 
undertaking representation of other claimants outside the framework of the 
Agreement is, in my opinion, compatible with applicable ethical standards, 
having regard for circumstances involved.  Generally, a lawyer may not  
agree to refrain from representation of other potential clients in connection 
with settlement of a controversy on behalf of a client.  See New York DR 2-
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108(B).  Virginia’s rule is less restrictive.  See Va. Code of Prof. Resp. Rule 
5.6(b)  However, in the present situation the representation of the Claimants 
under the Agreement could well constitute a conflict of interest with other 
potential clients, in light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Inc., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), and Amchem Products, Inc. 
v. Windosor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  Such a conflict could result in jeopardy to 
the settlements under the Agreement, and thus be disadvantageous both to 
Nextel and, eventually, to various Claimants.  In addition, the Agreement 
contemplates continuing cooperative procedures between Leeds Morelli and 
Nextel that could be jeopardized if the law firm pursued litigation on terms 
inconsistent with the Agreement.  In these circumstances, in my opinion the 
agreement by Leeds Morelli does not improperly “restrict” the firm’s right to 
practice within the intendment of New York DR 2-108(B).  For the same 
reason it does not constitute a “broad restriction” on Leeds Morelli, see Va. 
Code of Prof. Resp., Rule 5.6(b).  The Leeds Morelli agreement not to refer 
to other lawyers any potential claimants who make inquiry of the firm falls  
in the same category. 
 The contemplated arrangement whereby Nextel will engage Leeds 
Morelli after the claims are resolved is set forth in the proposed Agreement 
and hence will be made prior to conclusion of the settlement process.  The 
prospect of such employment would involve a conflict of interest on the part 
of the Leeds Morelli firm.  See New York DR 5-105(a); Va. Code of Prof. 
Resp., Rule 1; ABA Model Rule 1.7.  However, in my opinion it is a 
“constable” conflict, i.e., a conflict that may be waived by the affected 
clients.  Obviously, Nextel will not become a client until the settlements are 
resolved.  However, the individual Claimants are present clients of the Leeds 
Morelli firm and their informed consents should be obtained. 
 The consents should address both of the arrangements, i.e., the 
payment in lieu of the Claimants’ attorneys fee and expenses and the 
contemplated subsequent employment of Leeds Morelli by Nextel.   
It is not obligatory that the consents of the claimants represented by Leeds 
Morelli be in writing, except in a few jurisdictions such as California.  
However, the Agreement appropriately calls for the consents to be in  
writing, partly as protection against misunderstanding and subsequent  
dispute but also to impress on the clients that a substantial matter is  
involved. 
 You have inquired whether the payment in lieu of the Claimants’ 
attorneys’ fees and expenses may be made through one fund rather than in 
separate payments.  In my opinion the method of payment is a matter of 
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convenience, so long as the fact of the payments is disclosed and made the 
basis of a consent on the part of the affected Claimants. 
 In addition, I note the following provisions of the proposed 
Agreement: 
 First, the Agreement provides that the claim and resolution of each 
Claimant is not to be disclosed to other Claimants.  In my opinion this is 
proper.  The procedure and substance of the arrangement under the proposed 
Agreement is not an “aggregate settlement” within the meaning of New  
York DR 5-106(A); Va. Code Prof. Resp., Rule 1.8(g); and ABA Model  
Rule 1.8(g).  An “aggregate settlement” is one in which a fixed sum is to be 
divided among two or more claimants.  In such a settlement, fairness to the 
participants requires that each one know the allocation made to the others.  
The procedure under the proposed Agreement, in contrast, calls for separate 
settlement or resolution of each Claimant’s claim on its own footing.  
Accordingly, in my opinion the rule concerning disclosure in aggregate 
settlements has no application. 
 Second, the form of Individual Agreement sets forth a consent by the 
Claimant executing such a document to the conflicts described above.  Such  
a consent is valid only if predicated on adequate disclosure.  I assume that 
Leeds Morelli will provide such a disclosure.  The disclosure should be in 
writing for any claimant who is a resident of California. 
 Third, the Agreement calls for the Claimants to continue engagement 
of Leeds Morelli through the whole ADR process.  The Claimants can make 
such a commitment on a moral basis but it is not legally binding.  A client  
has authority to discharge a lawyer at any time, for any reason or no reason.  
There are decisions suggesting that this right of discharge may not be  
infringed by imposition of adverse consequences to a client who exercises  
the right.  I express no opinion whether the provisions on this subject in the 
proposed Agreement constitute such an infringement.  I recommend that the 
disclosure and consent by the Claimants address this issue. 
 
                
 
 
